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Robert H. Sitkoff and Max M. Schanzenbach 
Jurisdictional Competition for Trust Funds:  
An Empirical Analysis of Perpetuities and Taxes 
abstract.   This Article presents the first empirical study of the domestic jurisdictional 
competition for trust funds. To allow donors to exploit a loophole in the federal estate tax, since 
1986 a host of states have abolished the Rule Against Perpetuities as applied to interests in trust. 
To allow individuals to shield assets from creditors, since 1997 a handful of states have validated 
self-settled asset protection trusts. Based on reports to federal banking authorities, we find that, 
on average, through 2003 a state’s abolition of the Rule increased its reported trust assets by $6 
billion (a 20% increase) and increased its average trust account size by $200,000. By contrast, 
our examination of validating self-settled asset protection trusts yielded indeterminate results. 
Our perpetuities findings imply that roughly $100 billion in trust funds have moved to take 
advantage of the abolition of the Rule. Interestingly, states that levied an income tax on trust 
funds attracted from out of state experienced no observable increase in trust business after 
abolishing the Rule. Because this finding implies that abolishing the Rule does not directly 
increase a state’s tax revenue, it bears on the study of jurisdictional competition. In spite of the 
lack of direct tax revenue from attracting trust business, the jurisdictional competition for trust 
funds is patently real and intense. Our findings also speak to unresolved issues of policy 
concerning state property law and federal tax law. 
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introduction 
By the end of 2004, twenty states had validated perpetual trusts by 
abolishing the centuries-old Rule Against Perpetuities1 as applied to interests in 
trust. The driving force behind the erosion of the Rule was not a careful 
reconsideration of the ancient common law policy against perpetuities, but 
rather a 1986 reform to the federal tax code. Under the 1986 Code (as amended 
through 2005), a transferor can pass $1 million during life, or $1.5 million at 
death, free from federal wealth transfer taxes.2 By passing this $1 million or 
$1.5 million in trust, a transferor can ensure that successive generations benefit 
from the trust fund, free from federal wealth transfer taxes, for as long as state 
perpetuities law will allow the trust to endure. In a state that has abolished the 
Rule, successive generations can benefit from the trust fund, free from 
subsequent federal wealth transfer taxation, forever. 
This Article presents the results of the first empirical study of the 
jurisdictional competition for trust funds. Based on state-level panel data 
assembled from annual reports to federal banking authorities by institutional 
trustees, we find that the interstate competition for trust funds is both real and 
intense. Our analysis indicates that, on average, through 2003 a state’s 
abolition of the Rule Against Perpetuities increased its reported trust assets by 
about $6 billion and its average trust account size by roughly $200,000. To put 
these figures in perspective, in 2003 the average state had roughly $19 billion in 
reported trust assets and an average account size of about $1 million. In the 
timeframe of our data, seventeen states abolished the Rule, implying that 
through 2003 roughly $100 billion in trust assets have moved as a result of the 
Rule’s abolition.3 This figure represents about 10% of the total trust assets 
reported to federal banking authorities in 2003. 
Prior to our study, the evidence of jurisdictional competition in trust law 
has been entirely anecdotal. Lawyers and bankers in New York and other states 
that have not abolished the Rule regularly complain about the loss of billions of 
dollars in trust business to South Dakota, Delaware, and other trust-friendly 
 
1.  We will also refer to the Rule Against Perpetuities as “the Rule” or “the RAP.”  
2.  Federal wealth transfer taxes comprise estate, gift, and generation-skipping transfer (GST) 
taxes. For an accessible introduction, see STEPHANIE J. WILLBANKS, FEDERAL ESTATE AND 
GIFT TAXATION: AN ANALYSIS AND CRITIQUE (3d ed. 2004). 
3.  The $100 billion figure is only a point estimate. For discussion of this estimate and its 
confidence interval, see infra note 125 and accompanying text. 
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jurisdictions.4 The practitioner journals on estate planning are rife with 
assessments of the different state laws and advertisements by banks and trust 
companies touting the virtues of one state or another.5 Anecdotes of 
competition have even been reported by popular media outlets such as the Wall 
Street Journal, New York Times, and Forbes Magazine.6 
In spite of this anecdotal evidence, before our study there were at least two 
reasons to doubt the magnitude of the jurisdictional competition for trust 
funds. First, no state collects a filing or other fee on the creation of a private 
trust under its law, and several of the leading jurisdictions that have abolished 
the Rule do not levy income taxes on trust funds attracted from out of state.7 
Hence, in these states there is no direct state revenue payoff from attracting 
trust funds. 
Second, the main tax benefits of a trust not subject to the Rule Against 
Perpetuities accrue not to the donor, but to beneficiaries whose interest in the 
trust will not vest within twenty-one years of the death of a life in being at the 
 
4.  See, e.g., Charles F. Gibbs & Colleen F. Carew, Trusts Leaving New York, Situs in Cyberspace: 
Time for Legislation?, N.Y. L.J., Dec. 20, 2002, at 3, 3 (“Our New York state trust banker 
friends have been proclaiming for some years now a substantial loss of trust business to 
Delaware, South Dakota, and other more-hospitable venues.”); Charles F. Gibbs & Marilyn 
Ordover, An Open Letter to Assemblywoman Ann Carrozza, N.Y. L.J., Feb. 5, 2001, at 3 
(arguing that “to remain competitive with the other states,” New York must repeal the 
RAP); Thomas Scheffey, Is Immortality Just Around the Corner? “Dead Hand” Trust Law 
Relaxes Its Grip, CONN. L. TRIB., Mar. 4, 2002, at 10, 10 (noting that the Connecticut 
legislature was considering a revision of the Rule “in an effort to keep legal and banking 
work for ultra-rich clients from migrating to states with friendlier trust laws”). 
5.  See, e.g., JESSE DUKEMINIER, STANLEY M. JOHANSON, JAMES LINDGREN & ROBERT H. SITKOFF, 
WILLS, TRUSTS, AND ESTATES 714 (7th ed. 2005) (reproducing a Wells Fargo advertisement 
touting South Dakota as a “place where there is no rule against perpetuities” and “no 
fiduciary income tax”); Daniel G. Worthington, The Problems and Promise of Perpetual Trusts 
Laws, TR. & EST., Dec. 2004, at 15. 
6.  See Carole Gould, Shifting Rules Add Luster to Trusts, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 29, 2000, § 3, at 11; 
Rachel Emma Silverman, Building Your Own Destiny: States Toss Out Restrictions on Creating 
Perpetual Trusts; Downside—Fees Lost Forever, Too, WALL ST. J., Sept. 15, 2004, at D1; John 
Turrettini, Providing for the Year 3000, FORBES, June 11, 2001, at 220. In February 2005, the 
Wall Street Journal published an article summarizing our findings as reported in an earlier 
draft. Rachel Emma Silverman, Looser Trust Laws Lure $100 Billion, WALL ST. J., Feb. 16, 
2005, at D1; see also Bruce W. Fraser, The Rush to Dynasty Trusts, FIN. ADVISOR, June 2005, at 
111. 
7.  More precisely, these states do not levy a tax on income in a trust consisting of stocks, 
bonds, and other financial assets if the trust was settled by a nonresident for the benefit of 
nonresidents, even if an in-state bank or trust company serves as trustee and the trust 
provides that it is to be governed by the law of that state. See infra Subsection I.D.2. 
SITKOFF & SCHANZENBACH  FINAL 11/21/2005  6:55:00 PM 
jurisdictional competition for trust funds 
361 
 
time the trust became irrevocable. Hence, as compared with an ordinary in-
state trust, the added benefits of settling an out-of-state perpetual trust flow to 
beneficiaries who are remote descendants unknown to the donor.8 
Accordingly, the absence of empirical study of the jurisdictional 
competition for trust funds represents a gaping hole in the literature. This 
lacuna stems from the difficulties that inhere in such a project. First, because 
inter vivos trusts are private arrangements for which there are no public filings, 
it is commonly assumed that the data is unavailable. For example, Jesse 
Dukeminier and James Krier, authors of a widely used casebook on property 
law, believe that “[i]t is difficult to get hard data on the popularity of perpetual 
trusts among consumers.”9 Likewise, Eric Rakowski has written that “[t]here 
is no way to count [perpetual trusts] with certainty.”10 In a similar vein, the 
English Law Commission, which in the 1990s was tasked to make 
recommendations on perpetuities reform in England, “considered the 
possibility of commissioning a full study of the economic implications of 
abolishing the rule,” but declined to do so “because it proved impossible to 
obtain sufficient data.”11 
Second, the domestic perpetual trust phenomenon exists at the intersection 
of several varied and complex bodies of law, including the Rule Against 
Perpetuities, federal wealth transfer taxes, and state fiduciary income taxes. 
Designing an empirical study of the perpetual trust phenomenon thus requires 
sensitivity to each of those fields. Moreover, to avoid omitting other potentially 
relevant variables, empirical study of the perpetual trust phenomenon also 
requires accounting for other possible margins of jurisdictional competition for 
trust funds. Perhaps the most significant is the rise of the self-settled asset 
protection trust. Contrary to traditional law, in a jurisdiction that has validated 
 
8.  For example, suppose that the donor’s grandchild is living at the time the trust becomes 
irrevocable. That grandchild is a measuring life validating a remainder in that grandchild’s 
unborn children, who would be the transferor’s great-grandchildren. In such a scenario, 
assuming the trust is for that particular grandchild’s branch of the family only, the first 
generation for which abolition of the Rule makes a difference is that of the donor’s great-
great-grandchildren, who share only a 6.25% genetic overlap with the donor. We thank 
Lawrence Waggoner for suggesting the genetic calculation. 
9.  Jesse Dukeminier & James E. Krier, The Rise of the Perpetual Trust, 50 UCLA L. REV. 1303, 
1315 (2003). 
10.  Eric Rakowski, The Future Reach of the Disembodied Will, 4 POL. PHIL. & ECON. 91, 124 n.8 
(2005). 
11.  ENGLISH LAW COMM’N, REPORT NO. 251, THE RULES AGAINST PERPETUITIES AND EXCESSIVE 
ACCUMULATIONS 20 (1998), available at http://www.lawcom.gov.uk/docs/lc251.pdf. 
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self-settled asset protection trusts, the settlor can shield assets from creditors 
by placing those assets in a trust for his or her own benefit. 
Our findings provide strong evidence of a national market for trust funds 
that is responsive to the interplay between state trust law and federal tax law. 
Contrary to the standard theoretical and practical accounts of jurisdictional 
competition, which view increased state tax revenue as the incentive for states 
to compete,12 we find that the only states that experienced an increase in trust 
business after abolishing the Rule were those that did not levy an income tax 
on trust funds attracted from out of state. Although in tension with the 
dominant model of jurisdictional competition, this finding is strongly intuitive. 
The demand for perpetual trusts was sparked by their utility in avoiding 
federal wealth transfer taxes.13 Donors who are sensitive to federal transfer 
taxes are likely also to be sensitive to state income taxes. 
Our findings have broad implications for both policy and theory. 
Regarding policy, we find strong evidence that transferors have been escaping 
the Rule’s application at an increasingly rapid pace since the mid-1990s. 
Although neither the federal wealth transfer taxes nor the interstate 
competition for trust funds relates to the policies underpinning the Rule, 
together they have mortally wounded the Rule by reducing it to a mere 
transaction cost. Accordingly, to the extent that the policies underpinning the 
Rule continue to have contemporary relevance, it is necessary to look elsewhere 
to service those policies. 
Our results are also relevant to the ongoing policy debate in Congress and 
elsewhere over the future of federal wealth transfer taxation.14 A principal tax 
policy underlying the 1986 code, the relevant features of which remain in effect 
today, is to prevent the “enjoyment of property followed by its movement 
 
12.  See, e.g., ROBERTA ROMANO, THE GENIUS OF AMERICAN CORPORATE LAW 6-16 (1993); 
William W. Bratton & Joseph A. McCahery, The New Economics of Jurisdictional Competition: 
Devolutionary Federalism in a Second-Best World, 86 GEO. L.J. 201, 235-39 (1997); Dennis 
Epple & Allan Zelenitz, The Implications of Competition Among Jurisdictions: Does Tiebout Need 
Politics?, 89 J. POL. ECON. 1197, 1204-10 (1981); Daryl J. Levinson, Empire-Building 
Government in Constitutional Law, 118 HARV. L. REV. 915, 945-49 (2005). 
13.  See Max M. Schanzenbach & Robert H. Sitkoff, Perpetuities or Taxes: Explaining the Rise of 
the Perpetual Trust, 27 CARDOZO L. REV. (forthcoming 2006). 
14.  See, e.g., STAFF OF J. COMM. ON TAXATION, 109TH CONG., OPTIONS TO IMPROVE TAX 
COMPLIANCE AND REFORM TAX EXPENDITURES 392-424 (Comm. Print 2005), available at 
http://www.house.gov/jct/s-2-05.pdf; infra note 170 and accompanying text. 
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down the generations without being subjected to estate or gift tax.”15 If 
Congress wants to put this policy into practice, it will need to close the 
loophole opened by the states that have abolished the Rule Against 
Perpetuities. Successful implementation of federal tax policy necessarily 
requires attention to its interaction with state property law. It is thus worth 
noting that, in a recent report, the staff of the Joint Committee on Taxation 
proposed closing the perpetuities loophole—but its analysis is based in part on 
an empirical assumption that we show to be erroneous.16 
On a theoretical level, our findings are relevant to the ongoing scholarly 
debate over the nature of jurisdictional competition. Our findings not only 
contradict the simple, state-revenue-based model but also cast doubt on recent 
high-profile work that, by showing a lack of tax revenue from attracting new 
business, questions the existence of the phenomenon.17 Instead, our findings 
lend support to an interest group model, one that is informed by public choice 
theory.18 Even if attracting business does not directly increase the state’s tax 
revenue, local interest groups nonetheless may benefit from, and hence lobby 
for, laws that will attract business to the state. 
The rest of the Article is organized as follows. Part I frames the empirical 
analysis by examining the relevant legal issues: the race to abolish the Rule 
Against Perpetuities, the pertinent features of the federal wealth transfer tax 
system, the state taxation of trust income, and the controversial recognition of 
self-settled asset protection trusts. Part II describes the data set and briefly 
addresses its limitations. Part III presents our empirical analysis, which 
proceeds in three steps. First, we present an initial analysis of the raw data. In 
some key states, the effect of abolishing the Rule is so readily apparent that 
simple graphical depictions are highly suggestive. Second, we present a more 
 
15.  JEFFREY N. PENNELL, WEALTH TRANSFER PLANNING AND DRAFTING ch. 18, at 27 (2005); see 
H.R. REP. NO. 99-426, at 824-25 (1985); STAFF OF J. COMM. ON TAXATION, supra note 14, at 
394; WILLBANKS, supra note 2, § 15.07, at 235-38. 
16.  See STAFF OF J. COMM. ON TAXATION, supra note 14, at 392-95. This report is discussed below 
in the text accompanying notes 172-173. 
17.  See Lucian Arye Bebchuk & Assaf Hamdani, Vigorous Race or Leisurely Walk: Reconsidering 
the Competition over Corporate Charters, 112 YALE L.J. 553 (2002); Marcel Kahan & Ehud 
Kamar, The Myth of State Competition in Corporate Law, 55 STAN. L. REV. 679, 693 (2002). 
18.  See, e.g., William J. Carney, The Political Economy of Competition for Corporate Charters, 26 J. 
LEGAL STUD. 303 (1997); Jonathan R. Macey & Geoffrey P. Miller, Toward an Interest-Group 
Theory of Delaware Corporate Law, 65 TEX. L. REV. 469 (1987); Robert H. Sitkoff, Corporate 
Political Speech, Political Extortion, and the Competition for Corporate Charters, 69 U. CHI. L. 
REV. 1103, 1143-49 (2002). 
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formal econometric analysis that employs a standard differences-in-differences 
regression methodology that controls for contemporaneous changes in state 
law and relevant economic factors. Third, we offer a nontechnical summary of 
our principal findings. Part IV assesses the implications of our findings for the 
various policy and scholarly debates identified above. After a short conclusion, 
the tables summarizing our regression results (Tables 1–4), our dating of trust 
law changes (Table 5), and two substantive appendices follow. 
i. jurisdictional competition for trust funds 
In this Article we examine the effect of abolishing the Rule Against 
Perpetuities on a state’s trust business. To do so, however, we must also 
account for other state trust and tax laws that might influence a donor’s choice 
of jurisdiction. Accordingly, in this Part we review: (1) the Rule Against 
Perpetuities; (2) the relevance of the Rule for minimizing federal estate, gift, 
and generation-skipping transfer taxes (collectively, the federal wealth transfer 
taxes); (3) the controversial authorization of self-settled asset protection trusts; 
and (4) the state income taxation of trust funds attracted from out of state. 
A. The Rule Against Perpetuities19 
Few rules of property law are as storied as the Rule Against Perpetuities. 
The classic formulation is that of John Chipman Gray: “No interest is good 
unless it must vest, if at all, not later than twenty-one years after some life in 
being at the creation of the interest.”20 The period of the Rule reflects a 
common law policy that a transferor should be allowed to tie up property for 
only as long as the life of anyone possibly known to the transferor plus the next 
generation’s minority (hence lives in being plus twenty-one years).21 
 
19.  Portions of this Section draw on DUKEMINIER ET AL., supra note 5, at 674-77, 686, 695-99. 
20.  JOHN CHIPMAN GRAY, THE RULE AGAINST PERPETUITIES § 201, at 191 (Roland Gray ed., 4th 
ed. 1942). 
21.  See W. Barton Leach & Owen Tudor, The Common Law Rule Against Perpetuities, in 6 
AMERICAN LAW OF PROPERTY § 24.16, at 51 (A. James Casner ed., 1952) (noting that the Rule 
permits “a man of property . . . [to] provide for all of those in his family whom he personally 
knew and the first generation after them upon attaining majority”). As Hobhouse put it: 
A clear, obvious, natural line is drawn for us between those persons and events 
which the Settlor knows and sees, and those which he cannot know or see. 
Within the former province we may trust his natural affections and his capacity of 
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The Rule is said to have two purposes: to keep property marketable and to 
limit “dead hand” control. Preventing indefinite fracturing of property ownership 
implements the first policy. The idea is that ownership of land periodically will be 
reconstituted into fee simple because all contingent future interests in the 
property must vest or fail within the perpetuities period. 
The dead hand rationale for the Rule is best understood in light of the 
disagreeable consequences that can arise from unanticipated circumstances.22 The 
Rule implements this anti-dead hand policy by curbing future interests that, after 
some period of time and change in circumstances, tie up the property in 
potentially disadvantageous arrangements. As Brian Simpson explained, “given 
that one can, to a limited extent only, foresee the future and the problems it will 
generate, landowners should not be allowed to tie up lands for periods outside the 
range of reasonable foresight.”23 Forever is a long time. 
Measured against these two purposes, the Rule is both underinclusive and 
overinclusive. The Rule is underinclusive because it only applies to contingent 
interests, but vested interests that will not become possessory for a long period of 
time can also compromise the Rule’s underlying policy objectives.24 It is 
overinclusive because if the trustee is given the power to sell the trust property 
 
 
judgment to make better dispositions than any external Law is likely to make for 
him. Within the latter, natural affection does not extend, and the wisest judgment 
is constantly baffled by the course of events. 
Arthur Hobhouse, The Devolution and Transfer of Land, Address Delivered at the Social 
Science Congress at Leeds (Oct. 1871), in THE DEAD HAND: ADDRESSES ON THE SUBJECT OF 
ENDOWMENTS AND SETTLEMENTS OF PROPERTY 161, 188 (London, Chatto & Windus 1880). 
22.  Compare T.P. Gallanis, The Rule Against Perpetuities and the Law Commission’s Flawed Philosophy, 
59 CAMBRIDGE L.J. 284 (2000) (urging that the dead hand argument be conceived in terms of 
the economic consequences of perpetuities), with ENGLISH LAW COMM’N, supra note 11, at 5, 8, 
20 (rooting the dead hand argument in terms of intergenerational fairness), and LEWIS M. 
SIMES, THE THOMAS M. COOLEY LECTURES: PUBLIC POLICY AND THE DEAD HAND 55, 58-59 (1955) 
(same). 
23.  A.W.B. SIMPSON, LEGAL THEORY AND LEGAL HISTORY 159-60 (1987). Simpson continued: 
“The good patriarch looks into the future, but not too long. . . . The compromise which 
English law adopted was to allow property to be tied up for the lifetime of someone in 
existence at the time of the settlement and a reasonable period thereafter—for example, a 
minority . . . .” Id. But see Jonathan R. Macey, Private Trusts for the Provision of Private Goods, 
37 EMORY L.J. 295, 307 (1998) (arguing that settlors “will take the possibility of unforeseen 
contingencies into account when creating the trust”). 
24.  See T.P. Gallanis, The Future of Future Interests, 60 WASH. & LEE. L. REV. 513, 559-60 (2003). 
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and reinvest the proceeds, as is typical,25 there is no concern with marketability.26 
Nonetheless, the prevailing academic view is that the Rule “does, by and large, 
effectively prevent tying up property for an inordinate length of time.”27 
Under the orthodox Rule’s possibilities test, even the most implausible 
assumption about what might happen will render a contingent future interest 
invalid. Hence the casebooks are replete with improbable scenarios involving 
bizarre occurrences such as childbearing octogenarians and toddlers, unborn 
widows, inexhaustible gravel pits, wars that never end, slothful executors, and 
explosive birthday presents.28 The unborn widow scenario is illustrative. Thus: 
Case 1. “The Unborn Widow.” T bequeaths a fund in trust to H for life, 
then to H’s widow for life, then the remainder to H’s surviving 
descendants. Even if H is married to W1 at T’s death, the marriage 
might end and then H could marry W2, who might not have been born 
before T’s death. In such a case, the remainder to H’s descendants will 
not vest until the death of W2, which could happen more than twenty-
one years after the death of all lives in being at the time of T’s death. 
Such cases, plus the many booby traps that lie hidden in the Rule’s intricacies, 
brought the common law Rule—but not its underlying policy against remote 
vesting—into disrepute. 
Beginning in the 1950s, dissatisfaction with the Rule’s exasperating 
complexities and absurd assumptions led to reform to stay what Barton Leach 
 
25.  The modern trustee’s default powers are broad. See UNIFORM TRUST CODE §§ 815-816 
(2000); RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TRUSTS § 85 (Tentative Draft No. 4, 2005); DUKEMINIER 
ET AL., supra note 5, at 777-78; John H. Langbein, The Contractarian Basis of the Law of Trusts, 
105 YALE L.J. 625, 640-43 (1995). 
26.  See SIMES, supra note 22, at 40-42. Although the Rule began as a device to curb tying up 
land, it was eventually extended to personal property. Today, because almost all life estates 
and future interests are created in trust rather than as legal interests, the Rule’s primary 
modern application is to interests in trusts funded with stocks, bonds, and other liquid 
financial assets. 
27.  DUKEMINIER ET AL., supra note 5, at 675. 
28.  See ELIAS CLARK ET AL., GRATUITOUS TRANSFERS 753-69 (1985); JOEL C. DOBRIS ET AL., 
ESTATES AND TRUSTS: CASES AND MATERIALS 839-48 (2d ed. 2003); JESSE DUKEMINIER & 
JAMES E. KRIER, PROPERTY 306-11 (5th ed. 2002); DUKEMINIER ET AL., supra note 5, at 678-
86; WILLIAM M. MCGOVERN, JR. & SHELDON F. KURTZ, WILLS, TRUSTS AND ESTATES 457 (3d 
ed. 2004); EUGENE F. SCOLES ET AL., DECEDENTS’ ESTATES AND TRUSTS 1075-78 (6th ed. 
2000); JOSEPH WILLIAM SINGER, PROPERTY LAW 608-09 (3d ed. 2002); VALERIE J. VOLLMAR 
ET AL., AN INTRODUCTION TO TRUSTS AND ESTATES 982-85 (2003); LAWRENCE W. 
WAGGONER ET AL., FAMILY PROPERTY LAW 1206-18 (3d ed. 2002). 
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famously called “the slaughter of the innocents” in the Rule’s “reign of 
terror.”29 Some states enacted statutory fixes for specific fantasy scenarios, in 
particular the unborn widow and the fertile octogenarian. Other states 
authorized the courts to reform instruments that otherwise would have been 
void ab initio. Still other states adopted the so-called wait-and-see principle 
whereby courts wait to see if, in light of actual instead of possible events, the 
interest will in fact vest or fail within a specified period. The culmination of the 
perpetuities reform movement was the 1986 Uniform Statutory Rule Against 
Perpetuities (USRAP). USRAP, some form of which is now in force in about 
half the states, provides a wait-and-see period of ninety years and authorizes 
reformation of instruments that would otherwise violate the Rule. 
The foregoing reforms were not without controversy. On the contrary, the 
debate “came to resemble a holy war.”30 Leach’s advocacy of wait-and-see in 
the 1950s prompted a wave of forceful opposition led by the University of 
Michigan’s Lewis Simes.31 When Leach’s Harvard colleague James Casner 
proposed writing wait-and-see into the Restatement (Second) of Property in 
the late 1970s, Professor Richard Powell, then almost ninety, came out of 
retirement to join with his Columbia colleagues Curtis Berger and Louis Lusky 
to speak against doing so. In 1986, with the promulgation of USRAP, still 
another epic battle broke out, this time between UCLA’s Jesse Dukeminier and 
Michigan’s Lawrence Waggoner, USRAP’s principal drafter.32 
 
29.  See W. Barton Leach, Perpetuities in Perspective: Ending the Rule’s Reign of Terror, 65 HARV. L. 
REV. 721 (1952); W. Barton Leach, Perpetuities: Staying the Slaughter of the Innocents, 68 L.Q. 
REV. 35 (1952). 
30.  Dukeminier & Krier, supra note 9, at 1306; see also Susan F. French, Perpetuities: Three Essays 
in Honor of My Father, 65 WASH. L. REV. 323, 332-34 (1990) (describing the “Perpetuities 
Wars”). 
31.  See Lewis M. Simes, Is the Rule Against Perpetuities Doomed? The “Wait and See” Doctrine, 52 
MICH. L. REV. 179, 184-90 (1953). Leach responded to Simes and other critics of wait-and-
see in W. Barton Leach, Perpetuities Legislation: Hail, Pennsylvania!, 108 U. PA. L. REV. 1124 
(1960). For a comprehensive bibliography on perpetuities reform, see 10 POWELL ON REAL 
PROPERTY § 75A.07 (Michael Allan Wolf ed., 2000). There exists no precise count of the 
trees sacrificed to the perpetuities wars. 
32.  The Dukeminier/Waggoner debate centered on the mechanics for measuring the wait-and-
see period. Waggoner supported USRAP’s ninety-year period. Dukeminier favored using 
lives causally related to vesting and argued that adoption of USRAP’s ninety-year period 
would lead eventually to the Rule’s demise. The articles in this debate include (in 
chronological order) Lawrence W. Waggoner, Perpetuity Reform, 81 MICH. L. REV. 1718 
(1983); Jesse Dukeminier, Perpetuities: The Measuring Lives, 85 COLUM. L. REV. 1648 (1985) 
(launching the opening salvo in a four-piece, 100-page exchange with Waggoner in a single 
issue of the Columbia Law Review); Jesse Dukeminier, Wait-and-See: The Causal Relationship 
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Both the existence and the ferociousness of those debates have relevance to 
the present study for two reasons. First, they bring into sharp relief the 
abruptness of abolishing the Rule altogether. The prior debates focused on 
reforming the Rule, not abandoning it. Outright abolition represents a stark 
departure from a longstanding principle of Anglo-American common law. Yet 
there has been little or no debate on the merits of the Rule in the state 
legislatures that have abolished it.33  
Second, our analysis may throw light on a significant point of dispute 
between Waggoner and Dukeminier. Dukeminier argued that lawyers might 
use USRAP’s ninety-year wait-and-see period as a planning device, employing 
ninety-year trusts instead of designing more tailored trusts using special 
powers of appointment and the like.34 We therefore test whether a state’s 
 
Principle, 102 L.Q. REV. 250 (1986); Jesse Dukeminier, The Uniform Statutory Rule Against 
Perpetuities: Ninety Years in Limbo, 34 UCLA L. REV. 1023 (1987) [hereinafter Dukeminier, 
Limbo]; and Lawrence W. Waggoner, The Uniform Statutory Rule Against Perpetuities: The 
Rationale of the 90-Year Waiting Period, 73 CORNELL L. REV. 157 (1988). For perspectives on 
USRAP by persons other than Dukeminier and Waggoner, see Ira Mark Bloom, Perpetuities 
Refinement: There Is an Alternative, 62 WASH. L. REV. 23 (1987); Mary Louise Fellows, Testing 
Perpetuity Reforms: A Study of Perpetuity Cases 1984-89, 25 REAL PROP. PROB. & TR. J. 597 (1991); 
Amy Morris Hess, Freeing Property Owners from the RAP Trap: Tennessee Adopts the Uniform 
Statutory Rule Against Perpetuities, 62 TENN. L. REV. 267 (1995); and Ronald C. Link & Kimberly 
A. Licata, Perpetuities Reform in North Carolina: The Uniform Statutory Rule Against Perpetuities, 
Nondonative Transfers, and Honorary Trusts, 74 N.C. L. REV. 1783 (1996). See also Paul G. 
Haskell, A Proposal for a Simple and Socially Effective Rule Against Perpetuities, 66 N.C. L. REV. 
545, 562 (1988) (proposing a rule of trust duration of 125 years). 
33.  Dukeminier and Krier made this point strongly: “[The] absence of interest in perpetual 
trusts prior to the GST tax gives rise to the troubling likelihood that the Rule Against 
Perpetuities is being abolished with little if any reflection upon the merits of the Rule on its 
own, without regard to tax considerations.” Dukeminier & Krier, supra note 9, at 1317. There 
is, however, a considerable scholarly literature on the race to abolish the Rule. See, e.g., Ira 
Mark Bloom, The GST Tax Tail Is Killing the Rule Against Perpetuities, 87 TAX NOTES 569 
(2000); Verner F. Chaffin, Georgia’s Proposed Dynasty Trust: Giving the Dead Too Much 
Control, 35 GA. L. REV. 1 (2000); Joel C. Dobris, The Death of the Rule Against Perpetuities, or The 
RAP Has No Friends—An Essay, 35 REAL PROP. PROB. & TR. J. 601 (2000); Dukeminier & Krier, 
supra note 9; Stephen E. Greer, The Alaska Dynasty Trust, 18 ALASKA L. REV. 253 (2001); 
Rakowski, supra note 10; Stewart E. Sterk, Jurisdictional Competition To Abolish the Rule Against 
Perpetuities: R.I.P. for the R.A.P., 24 CARDOZO L. REV. 2097 (2003); Joshua C. Tate, Perpetual 
Trusts and the Settlor’s Intent, 53 U. KAN. L. REV. 595 (2005); Angela M. Vallario, Death by a 
Thousand Cuts: The Rule Against Perpetuities, 25 J. LEGIS. 141 (1999). 
34.  See JESSE DUKEMINIER & STANLEY M. JOHANSON, WILLS, TRUSTS, AND ESTATES 852 (6th ed. 
2000); Jesse Dukeminier, Dynasty Trusts: Sheltering Descendants from Transfer Taxes, 23 EST. 
PLAN. 417, 420-21 (1996); Dukeminier, Limbo, supra note 32, at 1039-41; Jesse Dukeminier, 
The Uniform Statutory Rule Against Perpetuities and the GST Tax: New Perils for Practitioners 
and New Opportunities, 30 REAL. PROP. PROB. & TR. J. 185, 207-09 (1995) [hereinafter 
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adoption of USRAP attracted trust assets to the state. This is an imperfect 
assessment of Dukeminier’s prediction, however, because in the period under 
study perpetual trusts became widely available. Whatever the advantages of a 
ninety-year trust, a perpetual trust offers more. 
Another reason to suppose that a state’s enactment of USRAP would not 
attract trust assets is the prior emergence of the perpetuities saving clause. A 
saving clause ensures that an overlooked violation of the Rule will not render 
the trust invalid.35 As a result, even in a jurisdiction that has retained the 
common law Rule, the state of the art in drafting makes it easy to establish a 
trust that will endure for a century, if not longer,36 and inclusion of a 
perpetuities saving clause is cheaper and easier than going out of state. Indeed, 
avoiding a perpetuities violation by inclusion of a saving clause is so simple 
that, contrary to a pernicious leading case, drafting an instrument that violates 
the Rule is almost certainly malpractice.37 
Until the recent movement to abolish the Rule Against Perpetuities, the 
unifying theme of perpetuities reform in the twentieth century was continuing 
respect for the longstanding policy against remote vesting. Even in its reformed 
versions and buffered by saving clauses, the Rule requires that contingent 
interests vest or fail within a specified period. For this reason, prior to its 
 
Dukeminier, Perils]; see also DOBRIS ET AL., supra note 28, at 895 (suggesting that USRAP is 
“likely to become a planning doctrine”). 
35.  See DAVID M. BECKER, PERPETUITIES AND ESTATE PLANNING 133-84 (1993); DUKEMINIER ET AL., 
supra note 5, at 695-96; WAGGONER ET AL., supra note 28, at 1218-27. 
36.  See PENNELL, supra note 15, ch. 18, at 26. Although probably not used in practice, see 
WAGGONER ET AL., supra note 28, at 1222-23, the idea of a “twelve-healthy-babies clause” has 
captured the academic imagination: 
[A] settlor, when motivated by vanity, is able to tie up his property, regardless of 
lives and deaths in his family, for . . . twenty-one years after the deaths of a dozen 
or so healthy babies chosen from families noted for longevity, a term which, in 
the ordinary course of events, will add up to about a century. 
Leach & Tudor, supra note 21, § 24.16, at 52. The English counterpart is the “royal lives 
clause,” which provides that the trust is to continue until twenty-one years after the death of 
all the living descendants of Queen Victoria or of some other British monarch. See ENGLISH 
LAW COMM’N, supra note 11, at 97-98. 
37.  In Lucas v. Hamm, 364 P.2d 685 (Cal. 1961), the court held that the atypical violation of the 
Rule at issue in that case did not amount to malpractice. In view of the development of 
saving clauses, however, Lucas is almost certainly no longer good law. See Wright v. 
Williams, 121 Cal. Rptr. 194, 199 n.2 (Ct. App. 1975); JOSEPH WILLIAM SINGER, 
INTRODUCTION TO PROPERTY § 7.7.4, at 333 (2d ed. 2005). 
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widespread abolition, the Rule continued to represent a practical constraint on 
trust duration.38 
B. Federal Wealth Transfer Taxes39 
Since the nineteenth century, Congress has levied taxes on gratuitous 
wealth transfers in the form of death and inter vivos gift taxes. Death taxes 
comprise both estate and inheritance taxes; the two are not synonymous. An 
estate tax is imposed on the decedent’s estate (the transferor). An inheritance 
tax is imposed on the beneficiaries (the transferees). 
Congress first levied an inheritance tax to help fund the Civil War and did 
so again in the 1890s to fund the war with Spain.40 During World War I, 
Congress turned to an estate tax, which it has continued to levy ever since. 
Prior to 1986, however, the estate tax could be avoided by using successive life 
interests.41 Because a life tenancy terminates at death and the estate tax applies 
only to the decedent’s transferable interests, there is no tax on the death of a 
life tenant. Thus: 
Case 2. The Successive Life Estates Loophole. O creates a trust for the 
benefit of her daughter A for life, and then to A’s daughter B for life 
(O’s grandchild), with the remainder to B’s children (O’s great-
grandchildren). Although O may have to pay a gift or estate tax upon 
the trust’s creation, no estate tax will be levied at the death of A or B. 
Not until the death of B’s children—O’s great-grandchildren—will 
another estate tax be due. 
 
38.  Because the Rule prohibits vesting outside of the applicable perpetuities period, the identity of 
all persons with a claim to the underlying property will be ascertained within that time. 
Once all the beneficiaries are ascertained, they can terminate the trust when the perpetuities 
period expires. The settlor cannot prevent this. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF PROPERTY: 
DONATIVE TRANSFERS § 2.1 (1981); 1A AUSTIN WAKEMAN SCOTT & WILLIAM FRANKLIN 
FRATCHER, THE LAW OF TRUSTS § 62.10, at 336 (4th ed. 1987). If the beneficiaries do not 
terminate the trust, the trust corpus will be distributed to the principal beneficiaries when 
the preceding life estates expire. 
39.  Portions of this Section draw on DUKEMINIER ET AL., supra note 5, at 845-49, 919-22. 
40.  For an excellent history of federal estate and inheritance taxes, see Louis Eisenstein, The Rise 
and Decline of the Estate Tax, 11 TAX L. REV. 223 (1956). 
41.  See REGIS W. CAMPFIELD ET AL., TAXATION OF ESTATES, GIFTS AND TRUSTS 722-24 (22d ed. 
2002); JEFFREY N. PENNELL, FEDERAL WEALTH TRANSFER TAXATION 981-83 (4th ed. 2003). 
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Congress sought to close the successive-life-estates loophole with the 
generation-skipping transfer (GST) tax under the Tax Reform Act of 1986.42 
In rough terms, a transfer to a grandchild, great-grandchild, or any other 
person who is two or more generations below the transferor is a generation-
skipping transfer; the GST tax is assessed on such transfers.43 Hence, in Case 2, 
a GST tax would be payable at the death of A and at the death of B. The GST tax 
rate equals the highest rate of the estate tax, currently 47%.44 
Under the 1986 Act, however, each transferor has a lifetime exemption 
from the estate and GST taxes, originally $1 million and now $1.5 million, 
which is scheduled to grow incrementally to $3.5 million by 2009.45 
Accordingly, a transferor can fund a trust with the amount of the exemption, 
free from transfer taxes, which will endure as long as state perpetuities law 
permits. The federal tax code puts no limit on the duration of the transfer tax 
exemption. Instead, Congress left it to state perpetuities law to limit the 
duration of a transfer-tax-exempt trust.46 Thus: 
Case 3. The Transfer-Tax-Exempt Trust. O funds a trust with $1.5 
million to pay income to O’s daughter A for life. A is given a special 
power to appoint the trust corpus outright or in further trust to O’s 
descendants or the spouses of such descendants.47 At A’s death, A 
 
42.  The GST tax provisions are located in Chapter 13 of the Internal Revenue Code. I.R.C. §§ 
2601-2663 (2000). Congress attempted to close the successive-life-estates loophole in the 
Tax Reform Act of 1976, but the 1976 scheme was later repealed retroactively. See PENNELL, 
supra note 41, at 981-88; WILLBANKS, supra note 2, § 15.01, at 220. 
43.  See I.R.C. § 2651 (2000) (defining generational assignments); id. § 2613 (defining skip and 
nonskip persons); id. § 2611 (defining generation-skipping transfers); id. § 2612 (defining 
taxable events); see also BORIS I. BITTKER ET AL., FEDERAL ESTATE AND GIFT TAXATION 562-67 
(9th ed. 2005) (discussing generation-skipping transfers); PAUL R. MCDANIEL ET AL., 
FEDERAL WEALTH TRANSFER TAXATION 713-16 (5th ed. 2003) (same). 
44.  The maximum rates are as follows: 49% in 2003; 48% in 2004; 47% in 2005; 46% in 2006; 
and 45% in 2007-2009. 26 U.S.C.S. §§ 2641, 2001(c)(2)(B) (LexisNexis 2005). 
45.  The exemption schedule is as follows: through 2003, $1 million; in 2004 and 2005, $1.5 
million; in 2006 through 2008, $2 million; and in 2009, $3.5 million. 26 U.S.C.S. §§ 
2631(c), 2010(c) (LexisNexis 2005). 
46.  “When Congress originally enacted a tax on generation-skipping transfers, it noted that 
‘[m]ost States have a rule against perpetuities which limits the duration of a trust.’” STAFF 
OF J. COMM. ON TAXATION, supra note 14, at 394 (quoting STAFF OF J. COMM. ON TAXATION, 
94TH CONG., GENERAL EXPLANATION OF THE TAX REFORM ACT OF 1976, at 565 (Comm. Print 
1976)). 
47.  Property subject to a special power, as compared with a general power, is not treated as 
belonging to the holder of the power for tax purposes. The difference is that the holder of a 
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exercises her power over the trust corpus by appointing it in her will to 
her children B and C in equal shares and in further trust, giving each a 
similar special power over the share of each, and so on. Although O 
may have had to pay some gift or estate tax upon creating the trust, no 
estate, gift, or GST tax will be due on the exercise of A’s, B’s, or C’s 
special power or the exercise of any other subsequent special power for 
as long as state perpetuities law permits.48 
Accordingly, in 1986 state perpetuities law became a highly salient factor in 
estate planning. The longer the trust in Case 3 could be extended, the more 
generations could benefit from the trust fund free from transfer taxes. 
For at least two reasons the $1.5 million (or even $3.5 million) figure 
understates the potential value of this loophole. First, subsequent appreciation 
in the value of the trust is likewise exempt from transfer taxation for as long as 
the trust may endure under state perpetuities law. Thus, estate planners 
recommend funding the trust with assets that are likely to experience 
significant appreciation.49 Second, the transfer tax rates are quite high 
(presently the maximum rate is 47%). Thus, if the trust were subject to the 
Rule Against Perpetuities, the fund would be halved at the death of each 
successive generation at the conclusion of the perpetuities period.50 
 
special power (sometimes also called a limited or nongeneral power) may not exercise it in 
favor of the holder, the holder’s creditors, the holder’s estate, or the creditors of the holder’s 
estate. I.R.C. § 2041 (2000). Special powers can thus be used to preserve much of the 
flexibility of ownership without incurring the tax liability of ownership. See DUKEMINIER ET 
AL., supra note 5, at 596. However, to avoid the risk that the power might be deemed a 
general power if the beneficiary could appoint the property outright to a minor child, a well-
drafted trust would prohibit the beneficiary from using the power to satisfy any obligation 
to support or educate any person. On the policy significance of allowing A to appoint the 
trust corpus outright, see infra text accompanying notes 146-147. 
48.  On the application of the Rule to powers of appointment, see DUKEMINIER ET AL., supra note 
5, at 690-95; and WAGGONER ET AL., supra note 28, at 1262-74. 
49.  See Dukeminier & Krier, supra note 9, at 1318-19; Pierce H. McDowell, III, Trust Forum 
Shopping: The Next Generation, TR. & EST., Aug. 1997, at 10, 10-11. 
50.  Although we are skeptical of his underlying assumptions, in a recent book Richard Nenno 
captured the magic of compound growth in the absence of a transfer tax at each generation. 
Assuming 5% after-tax growth and a GST tax that would be levied every twenty-five years, a 
transfer-tax-exempt perpetual dynasty trust funded initially with $1 million would be worth 
$131,501,258 after 100 years. This compares with $10,376,082 for an initial $1 million 
investment without perpetual transfer-tax-exempt status. See RICHARD W. NENNO, 
DELAWARE DYNASTY TRUSTS, TOTAL RETURN TRUSTS, AND ASSET PROTECTION TRUSTS 176-
77 (2005). 
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The foregoing remains the state of the law today, even after the Economic 
Growth and Tax Relief Reconciliation Act (EGTRRA) of 2001.51 
C. The Race To Abolish the RAP 
For reasons unrelated to the GST tax, Idaho, South Dakota, and Wisconsin 
had already abolished the Rule Against Perpetuities before 1986. But as we 
show below and in greater detail elsewhere,52 these states experienced little to 
no resulting advantage in the jurisdictional competition for trust funds prior to 
1986. Then came the Tax Reform Act of 1986. As the practicing bar digested 
the Act and grasped the nature of the GST tax, it became apparent that making 
use of the transferor’s exemption in a perpetual trust had significant long-term 
tax advantages.53 If the trust in Case 3, above, were created in Idaho, South 
Dakota, or Wisconsin, it could continue, free from federal wealth transfer 
taxation, generation after generation, forever. 
As a general matter, prior to 1986 there was little significant variation in 
trust law across the states.54 After the GST tax, however, state perpetuities law 
 
51.  Pub. L. No. 107-16, 115 Stat. 38 (2001). EGTRRA repealed the GST tax and the estate tax 
(but not the gift tax) as to transfers that take place in 2010. EGTRRA also reduced 
somewhat the marginal tax rates while increasing the lifetime exemption in the years before 
2010. See supra notes 44-45. But for transfers occurring in 2011 and beyond, it reinstates both 
the GST tax and the estate tax at their 2001 levels. Accordingly, unless one is certain that one 
will die in 2010, both the GST tax and the estate tax remain highly relevant considerations 
in estate planning. See, e.g., Report on Reform of Federal Wealth Transfer Taxes, 58 TAX LAW. 
93, 107-16 (2004) [hereinafter Report on Reform]. On the political economy of EGTRRA and 
the estate tax repeal movement, see MICHAEL J. GRAETZ & IAN SHAPIRO, DEATH BY A 
THOUSAND CUTS: THE FIGHT OVER TAXING INHERITED WEALTH (2005). See also David G. 
Duff, The Abolition of Wealth Transfer Taxes: Lessons from Canada, Australia and New Zealand 
(Univ. of Toronto Faculty of Law, Legal Studies Research Paper No. 05-08, 2005), available 
at http://ssrn.com/abstract=719744. 
52.  See Schanzenbach & Sitkoff, supra note 13; infra text accompanying notes 117-118. 
53.  To put the learning difficulties into perspective, consider that USRAP was amended in 
1990—four years after its promulgation and the enactment of the GST tax, both in 1986—
because of a potential tax problem (irrelevant for this Article) arising from the interaction of 
the two. See USRAP § 1(e), 8B U.L.A. 237 (1990); Dukeminier, Perils, supra note 34, at 187-
94. 
54.  State courts regularly cited the same leading authorities, namely, the 1959 Restatement 
(Second) of Trusts and the current versions of the Scott and Bogert treatises. See John H. 
Langbein, The Uniform Trust Code: Codification of the Law of Trusts in the United States, 15 TR. 
L. INT’L 66, 67 & n.3 (2001) (noting the pervasive influence of the Restatement (Second) of 
Trusts, “which has long been the most authoritative source for American trust law”). 
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became a highly salient margin of differentiation. Given prevailing choice-of-
law principles55 and the shift in the nature of wealth from land to financial 
assets (making trust assets portable),56 it was only a matter of time until 
jurisdictional competition sparked a race to abolish the Rule Against 
Perpetuities. 
To ensure that the law of state B will govern the validity and 
administration of a trust created by a settlor who resides in state A, lawyers 
usually advise the settlor not only to provide in the trust instrument that the 
law of state B is to govern, but also to name a trustee located in state B and to 
give that trustee custody of the trust fund. As a result, an out-of-state settlor 
who wants to invoke the law of state B typically will appoint as trustee a bank 
or trust company located in state B. Therein lies the payoff to state B and the 
political economy of the RAP’s demise. Ever since the perpetuities loophole in 
the GST tax was understood, abolition of the RAP has been “pushed by 
banking associations . . . [that] wish to remain competitive with banks where 
perpetual trusts are permitted.”57 Joel Dobris put it more bluntly: “When the 
bankers want something, they get it.”58 
To be sure, the abolition states do not expressly require naming an in-state 
trustee as a predicate to creating a perpetual trust. But the settlor is well 
advised to do so in order to provide a nexus with the state whose law is being 
invoked. Such a nexus increases the odds that another state’s courts will respect 
the settlor’s choice-of-law provision.59 Further, several of the abolition states 
 
55.  See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS §§ 270, 272 (1971). 
56.  See John H. Langbein, The Twentieth-Century Revolution in Family Wealth Transmission, 86 
MICH. L. REV. 722 (1988). 
57.  DUKEMINIER & JOHANSON, supra note 34, at 854; see also Assemb. 2804, 208th Leg., 1999 N.J. 
Laws 1115, available at http://www.njleg.state.nj.us/9899/Bills/A3000/2804_I1.pdf (stating 
that the purpose of repeal was “to permit banks and trust companies to offer ‘dynasty trusts’ 
to their customers, such as those that are being offered by banks and trust companies 
located in other states”); Rachel Wolcott, New Jersey Poised To Allow Dynasty Trusts, PRIVATE 
ASSET MGMT., May 17, 1999, at 1, 1 (stating that the New Jersey legislation, which was 
“sponsored by the New Jersey Bankers Association, was drawn up so that New Jersey trust 
institutions could avoid losing potential dynasty trust business and other types of trust 
business to Delaware, South Dakota, and Alaska”). 
58.  Joel C. Dobris, Changes in the Role and the Form of the Trust at the New Millennium, or, We 
Don’t Have To Think of England Anymore, 62 ALB. L. REV. 543, 572 (1998). 
59.  See 1 JEFFREY A. SCHOENBLUM, MULTISTATE AND MULTINATIONAL ESTATE PLANNING  
§ 17.01[F], at 1166-69 (2d ed. 1999); Sterk, supra note 33, at 2101-04. We say increases the 
odds because as yet there are no definitive appellate decisions. See Jeffrey A. Schoenblum, 
Reaching for the Sky—or Pie in the Sky: Is U.S. Onshore Trust Reform an Illusion?, in 
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have enacted statutes that provide that the appointment of an in-state trustee, 
while not necessary, is sufficient to ensure jurisdiction in that state’s courts and 
the applicability of that state’s law.60 
We do not claim that there are no transaction costs in moving financial 
assets to another state or that it is not simpler to name as trustee a local bank 
rather than an out-of-state bank. But as Stewart Sterk explained, naming an 
out-of-state “institution as trustee represents an insignificant constraint. 
Capital is extraordinarily mobile, so whether the trust property constitutes 
securities or cash, it will make little difference to the settlor whether legal title 
is held by” a local or an out-of-state bank.61 
For a variety of historical reasons, Delaware—the hegemon of corporate 
regulatory competition—has long been a trust-friendly jurisdiction and by 
1986 had a disproportionate share of the nation’s trust funds.62 Indeed, prior to 
the GST tax, on several occasions Delaware tweaked its perpetuities law to 
create tax and other advantages to settling a trust in Delaware.63 So it was 
 
EXTENDING THE BOUNDARIES OF TRUSTS AND SIMILAR RING-FENCED FUNDS 291, 297-302 
(David Hayton ed., 2002). 
60.  See, e.g., ALASKA STAT. § 13.36.035 (2004); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2131.09(B)(2)(b) 
(LexisNexis 2002); R.I. GEN. LAWS § 18-1-2 (2003); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 55-3-39 (2001); see 
also ALASKA STAT. § 13.36.043 (2004) (providing for change of situs to Alaska). See generally 
Larry E. Ribstein, Delaware, Lawyers, and Contractual Choice of Law, 19 DEL. J. CORP. L. 999 
(1994) (examining the use of choice-of-law statutes to facilitate jurisdictional competition). 
61.  Sterk, supra note 33, at 2104. 
62.  In regressions reported in a forthcoming study using state-level panel data from 1969 
through 1984, we find that Delaware’s aggregate trust business in that time period greatly 
exceeded that which would be predicted based on its population and income. See 
Schanzenbach & Sitkoff, supra note 13. Thus, in 1986 Delaware’s share of all trust funds held 
by federally reporting trustees was eight times larger than its share of the population (2% 
versus 0.25%). To make these figures less abstract, consider that in 1986, when New York 
institutional trustees held $3,500 in trust assets per state resident, Delaware institutional 
trustees held $12,600 in trust assets per state resident. Delaware’s dominant position is also 
apparent in infra Figure 4. 
63.  In 1986 Delaware reconfigured the Rule as applied to interests in trust into a 110-year 
limitation on trust duration. Act of July 3, 1986, ch. 422, 65 Del. Laws 831. Further, prior to 
1986, Delaware had enacted legislation providing that a new perpetuities period would 
begin on the exercise of a power of appointment, which remains good law in Delaware 
today. See Act of Apr. 6, 1933, ch. 198, 38 Del. Laws 678 (codified at DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 25, 
§ 501 (1989)). Hence Delaware made possible a perpetual trust long before 1995. However, 
Congress effectively foreclosed this option with I.R.C. § 2041(a)(3) (2000), which makes 
the extension of the perpetuities period under section 501 a taxable event for all trusts 
created in or after 1942. See DUKEMINIER ET AL., supra note 5, at 694-95; Jonathan G. 
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hardly a surprise when in 1995 Delaware became the first state after the 
enactment of the GST tax to abolish the Rule as applied to interests in trust.64 
The bill’s official synopsis makes its purpose plain: 
Several states, including Idaho, Wisconsin and South Dakota, 
have abolished altogether their rules against perpetuities, which has 
given those jurisdictions a competitive advantage over Delaware in 
attracting assets held in trusts created for estate planning purposes. . . .  
The multi-million dollar capital commitments to these 
irrevocable trusts, and the ensuing compound growth over decades, 
will result in the formation of a substantial capital base in the 
innovative jurisdictions that have abolished the rule against 
perpetuities. Several financial institutions have now organized or 
acquired trust companies, particularly in South Dakota, at least in part 
to take advantage of their favorable trust law. 
Delaware’s repeal of the rule against perpetuities for personal 
property held in trust will demonstrate Delaware’s continued vigilance 
in maintaining its role as a leading jurisdiction for the formation of 
capital and the conduct of trust business.65 
The Delaware statute triggered a race to abolish the Rule. Between 1997 
and 2000, Alaska, Arizona, Illinois, Maine, Maryland, New Jersey, Ohio, and 
Rhode Island authorized perpetual trusts. By late 2005, Colorado, Florida (360 
years), Missouri, Nebraska, Nevada (365 years), New Hampshire, Utah (1000 
years), Virginia, and Wyoming (1000 years) had followed suit. Legislation 
designed to abolish the Rule Against Perpetuities is under consideration in 
several other states.66 
Figure 1 illustrates the increasingly rapid pace of the Rule’s abolition. 
 
Blattmachr & Jeffrey N. Pennell, Adventures in Generation-Skipping, or How We Learned To Love 
the “Delaware Tax Trap,” 24 REAL PROP. PROB. & TR. J. 75 (1989). 
64.  See Act of July 7, 1995, 70 Del. Laws 428. 
65.  H.R. 245, 138th Gen. Assemb. (Del. 1995) (bill synopsis). 
66.  See Tate, supra note 33, at 604 n.45 (collecting pending legislation). 
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Figure 1. 
perpetual trust states 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 Before moving on, it is necessary to acknowledge some doctrinal nuances 
that we gloss over when we speak of the Rule’s abolition. Some states have 
abolished the Rule altogether. Some states have abolished it as applied to 
interests in trust if the trustee has the power to sell the trust assets and then 
reinvest the proceeds (in the technical jargon, as applied to trusts that do not 
suspend the power of alienation). Some states have abolished the Rule as 
applied to interests in personal property. Some have established such lengthy 
perpetuities periods (360 or even 1000 years) that in those states the Rule is 
barely recognizable. In still others, the Rule, which had always been construed 
as a mandatory rule to curtail the dead hand,67 has been changed to a default 
rule that applies unless the settlor provides otherwise. 
 
67.  Gray expressed this view in stronger language: 
The Rule against Perpetuities is not a rule of construction, but a peremptory 
command of law. It is not, like a rule of construction, a test, more or less artificial, 
to determine intention. Its object is to defeat intention. Therefore every provision 
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The subtle distinctions between these approaches have been carefully 
parsed elsewhere.68 For the purpose of this study, all that matters is whether 
the state’s perpetuities law in effect permits a perpetual trust. If the answer is 
yes, we count the state as having abolished the Rule. Our coding is detailed in 
Table 5. 
D. Additional Margins of Competition 
In general, there is little variation in the basic law of trusts across the 
states.69 Moreover, the law of trusts consists mainly of default rules that may 
be varied by the settlor.70 Accordingly, apart from state perpetuities law, in the 
usual case there is little reason to settle a trust out of state given the increased 
transaction costs of doing so. 
In this Section, we explore the two primary exceptions to the foregoing 
proposition, both of which involve mandatory rules (so that switching states is 
the only means of obtaining choice on these matters): (1) statutory validation 
of self-settled asset protection trusts, and (2) state fiduciary income taxes.71 
 
in a will or settlement is to be construed as if the Rule did not exist, and then to 
the provision so construed the Rule is to be remorselessly applied. 
GRAY, supra note 20, § 629. On the oddity of transmogrifying rules of law into rules of 
construction, see RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF PROPERTY: WILLS AND OTHER DONATIVE 
TRANSFERS § 16.3 cmt. a (Tentative Draft No. 4, 2004). 
68.  See Tate, supra note 33, at 603 n.44; Note, Dynasty Trusts and the Rule Against Perpetuities, 116 
HARV. L. REV. 2588, 2590-95 (2003). Readers familiar with the more arcane features of 
property law might ask about the rule against accumulations of income. In Delaware, 
Illinois, and South Dakota, which are among the most aggressive of the perpetual trust 
states, the legislatures have dealt with this question expressly. See DEL. CODE ANN., tit. 25, § 
506 (Supp. 2004); 765 ILL. COMP. STAT. 315/1 (2001); 1998 S.D. Sess. Laws, ch. 282, § 27. In 
states without legislative action, the law is less clear. But the common law accumulations period 
is the same as the perpetuities period. Thus, if the perpetuities period with respect to a particular 
trust is extended by repeal of the Rule, then the permissible accumulations period should be 
likewise extended. See Robert H. Sitkoff, The Lurking Rule Against Accumulations of Income, 
100 NW. U. L. REV. (forthcoming 2006). 
69.  See supra note 54. 
70.  See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TRUSTS § 4 cmt. a(1) (2003); John H. Langbein, Mandatory 
Rules in the Law of Trusts, 98 NW. U. L. REV. 1105 (2004); Robert H. Sitkoff, An Agency Costs 
Theory of Trust Law, 89 CORNELL L. REV. 621, 642-43 (2004). 
71.  We do not claim that these two factors, plus perpetuities law, exhaust the entire universe of 
rationales for choosing to settle a trust out of state in a particular case. However, based on a 
review of the scholarly and practitioner literature, as well as a series of interviews with 
lawyers and trust company officers, we are confident that these factors represent the only 
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These are the principal additional margins, beyond perpetuities law, on which 
the states compete for trust funds. Because several states changed their law on 
one or both of these issues in the period under study, it is necessary to control 
 
other motivations that are possibly of the same order of magnitude as the Rule Against 
Perpetuities. See, e.g., John A. Warnick & Sergio Pareja, Selecting a Trust Situs in the 21st 
Century, PROB. & PROP. Mar./Apr. 2002, at 53, 53 (identifying perpetuities, asset protection, 
and state income taxes as the main considerations). In view of the size of total trust assets 
held by federally reporting institutional fiduciaries, phenomena that do not measure in the 
billions will not affect our analysis—and we are confident that we have not missed any 
billion-dollar phenomena. Even so, for the sake of completeness we note here the two most 
plausible additional considerations: 
(1) Some readers might assume that the existence of a state death tax in the form of an 
estate or inheritance tax in excess of the credit formerly allowed against the federal estate tax 
could influence trust fund location. See 26 U.S.C.S. § 2058 (LexisNexis 2005); Jeffrey A. 
Cooper et al., State Estate Taxes After EGTRRA: A Long Day’s Journey into Night, 17 
QUINNIPIAC PROB. L.J. 317 (2004); Report on Reform, supra note 51, at 103-07. However, with 
respect to intangible personal property, which is to say stocks, bonds, and other financial 
assets (the stuff of modern trust funds), by statute or interstate agreement state death taxes 
are typically levied by domicile of the decedent, not by location of the trust fund. See 2 
JEROME R. HELLERSTEIN & WALTER HELLERSTEIN, STATE TAXATION ¶ 21.09, at 21-47 (3d ed. 
2002); 2 SCHOENBLUM, supra note 59, § 19.04, at 29-30. Escape from state death taxes thus 
requires changing one’s domicile, a subject on which there is a separate empirical literature. 
See, e.g., Karen Smith Conway & Jonathan C. Rork, Diagnosis Murder: The Death of State 
Death Taxes, 42 ECON. INQUIRY 537 (2004); Jon Bakija & Joel Slemrod, Do the Rich Flee from 
High State Taxes? Evidence from Federal Estate Tax Returns (Nat’l Bureau of Econ. Research, 
Working Paper No. 10645, 2004). Moreover, in unreported regressions in which we coded 
states that levy an estate or inheritance tax in excess of the federal credit as YES and the 
others as NO, we found no significant correlation between a change from YES to NO and 
reported trust assets. 
 (2) Some readers might suppose that unitrust statutes could influence trust fund 
location. In a unitrust the settlor sets a percentage of the value of the trust corpus to be paid 
each year to the income beneficiary, thereby allowing the trustee to invest for total return by 
freeing her from arbitrary income and principal classifications. See DUKEMINIER ET AL., supra 
note 5, at 829. Although statutory recognition is not necessary to create an enforceable 
unitrust under state law, a state statute is necessary to convert an existing principal and 
income trust into a unitrust, and for all unitrusts a state statute is all but mandatory for a 
host of federal tax reasons. See Adam J. Wiensch & L. Elizabeth Beetz, The Liberation of Total 
Return, TR. & EST., Apr. 2004, at 44; Robert B. Wolf & Stephan R. Leimberg, Total Return 
Trusts Approved by New Regs., but State Law Is Crucial, 31 EST. PLAN. 179 (2004). On this 
view, the presence of a unitrust statute might be a reason to locate a trust in one state versus 
another. However, the earliest statute was enacted by Delaware in 2001, and most were 
enacted in later years. The phenomenon is thus too recent to be reflected in our data. Given 
our coding scheme of recording the year after adoption as the year of the legal change, we 
would have only a handful of state-year observations. 
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for these factors in assessing the effect of the abolition of the Rule Against 
Perpetuities. 
1. Self-Settled Asset Protection Trusts72 
A longstanding principle of trust law holds that the settlor cannot shield 
assets from creditors by placing them in a trust for his or her own benefit. Even 
if the trust is discretionary, spendthrift, or both, the settlor’s creditors can 
reach the maximum amount that the trustee can pay the settlor or apply for the 
settlor’s benefit.73 Thus: 
Case 4. Self-Settled Trust. O, a surgeon, transfers property to X in trust 
to pay so much of the income and principal to O as X determines in X’s 
sole and absolute discretion. Five years later, O botches a routine 
surgery, causing grievous injury to the patient, A. A may enforce an 
award of damages against the entire corpus of the trust, because X 
could, in X’s discretion, pay the entire corpus to O. This result obtains 
even if the trust instrument provides that O’s interest may not be 
reached by O’s creditors (a spendthrift clause). Nor does it matter that 
O’s right to the trust assets is subject to X’s discretion. 
In the latter part of the twentieth century, however, several offshore and 
domestic jurisdictions enacted statutes that reverse the traditional rule, thereby 
giving rise to the self-settled asset protection trust (APT). If such a statute were 
applicable in Case 4, then A would have no recourse against the assets in the trust 
even if O admitted to botching A’s surgery and put up no defense in the 
malpractice suit. 
The story of the recognition of APTs begins in the sunny Caribbean, South 
Pacific, and other exotic offshore locales. In the 1980s, a host of such 
jurisdictions—including the Bahamas, Barbados, Belize, Bermuda, Cayman 
Islands, Cook Islands, Cyprus, Gibraltar, Grenada, Liechtenstein, Mauritius, 
Nevis, Samoa, St. Lucia, and Turks and Caicos—amended their trust laws to 
allow the creation of a self-settled trust against which the settlor’s creditors 
 
72.  Portions of this section draw on DUKEMINIER ET AL., supra note 5, at 557-60, 566-69. 
73.  See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TRUSTS §156 (1959). These rules are carried forward in 
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TRUSTS §§ 58(2), 60 cmt. f (2003); and UNIF. TR. CODE § 505 
(2000). 
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have no recourse.74 Although it has been conjectured that the value of offshore 
APTs exceeds $1 trillion,75 no reliable estimate exists. 
The APT migrated onshore in 1997 in the form of an innovative Alaska 
statute. This statute was drafted by a prominent New York trust lawyer, his 
brother (who is now the head of the Alaska Trust Company), and an Alaska 
lawyer. The three had the idea while on a fishing trip in Alaska.76 Under the 
Alaska statute, the settlor’s creditors have no recourse against the settlor’s interest 
in a self-settled discretionary trust provided that the initial transfer was not 
fraudulent.77 To ensure a local payoff, Alaska statutory law provides for both 
jurisdiction in the Alaska courts and the applicability of Alaska law if an Alaska 
 
74.  See Denis Kleinfeld, Choosing an Offshore Jurisdiction, in ASSET PROTECTION STRATEGIES: 
PLANNING WITH DOMESTIC AND OFFSHORE ENTITIES 73 (Alexander A. Bove, Jr. ed., 2002); 
Elena Marty-Nelson, Offshore Asset Protection Trusts: Having Your Cake and Eating It Too, 47 
RUTGERS L. REV. 11, 62 (1994); see also Lynn M. LoPucki, The Death of Liability, 106 YALE L.J. 1, 
32-40 (1996) (discussing “foreign haven strategies”). The Cook Islands’ International Trusts 
Act of 1984, which is representative, validates self-settled spendthrift trusts, provided that 
the beneficiary is not a resident of the Cook Islands. International Trusts Act 1984 (No. 14) 
§§ 2, 5(1) (Cook Islands), reprinted as amended in 2 INTERNATIONAL TRUST LAWS, at D8-3, 
D8-3, D8-6 (1999). As Sterk has observed, this qualification is “a sure sign that the purpose 
of the statute was to attract foreign capital.” Stewart E. Sterk, Asset Protection Trusts: Trust 
Law’s Race to the Bottom?, 85 CORNELL L. REV. 1035, 1048 (2000). 
75.  See Walter H. Diamond, Foreword to 1 INTERNATIONAL TRUST LAWS AND ANALYSIS (Walter 
H. Diamond et al. eds., 2004); see also Sterk, supra note 74, at 1036 (stating that 
“conservative estimates exceed one trillion dollars”). 
76.  See Douglas J. Blattmachr & Jonathan G. Blattmachr, A New Direction in Estate Planning: 
North to Alaska, TR. & EST., Sept. 1997, at 48; James L. Dam, New Trusts Will Offer Estate 
Tax Breaks, Protection from Creditors, LAW. WKLY., Apr. 21, 1997, at 1 (including a 
photograph of one of the fish caught); Brigid McMenamin, Flimsy Shelters, FORBES, Sept. 8, 
1997, at 94; Alaska Trust Co., The Genesis of the Alaska Trust Company, the Alaska Trust 
Act, and Other Unique Trust Legislation, http://www.alaskatrust.com/www/thegen.html 
(last visited Oct. 5, 2005). Representative Al Vezey sponsored the legislation. See Hearing on 
H.B. 101 Before the H. Comm. on Labor & Commerce, 20th Leg. (Alaska 1997) (statement of 
Rep. Vezey); Rose Ragsdale, Opposing Parties Join Forces To Attract Family Trust Industry to 
Alaska, ALASKA J. COM., Apr. 14, 1997, at 6. On passage of the Act the local media and Alaska 
lawyers and bankers predicted a substantial inflow of trust business. See Katharine Fraser, 
With New Law, Alaska Aiming To Be Trust Capital, AM. BANKER, Apr. 21, 1997, at 1; Carrie 
Lehman, Legislation Changes Alaska Tax, Trust Laws, Attracts New Investors to State, ALASKA J. 
COM., Aug. 18, 1997, at 6; Deanna Thomas, Trust Bill Could Mean Boon, ALASKA STAR, Mar. 
20, 1997, at 1. 
77.  ALASKA STAT. § 34.40.110 (2004). 
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resident or banking institution is designated as trustee and some of the trust 
assets are deposited with an Alaska institution.78 
In 1997 Delaware likewise validated APTs.79 The official synopsis of the 
Delaware bill states that it “is similar to legislation recently enacted in Alaska. It is 
intended to maintain Delaware’s role as the most favored domestic jurisdiction for 
the establishment of trusts.”80 Since then, Nevada (1999), Rhode Island (1999), 
Oklahoma (2004), Utah (2004), and South Dakota (2005) have passed statutes 
authorizing some form of APT, bringing the domestic count to at least seven.81 
 
 
 
78.  Id. § 13.36.035. A subsequent section authorizes the transfer of existing trusts to Alaska. Id. § 
13.36.043. 
79.  DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 12, §§ 3570-3576 (2001). The Delaware statute carves out an exception for 
support claims by children and former spouses and for claims arising from death, personal 
injury, or property damage that occurred before the trust was settled. Id. § 3573; see also 
NENNO, supra note 50, § 74; Richard W. Nenno & John E. Sullivan, III, Delaware Asset 
Protection Trusts: Avoiding Fraudulent Transfers and Attorney Liability, EST. PLAN., Jan. 2005, 
at 22. 
80.  H.R. 356, 139th Gen. Assemb., 71 Del. Laws 159 (1997); see Douglas J. Blattmachr & Richard 
W. Hompesch II, Alaska vs. Delaware: Heavyweight Competition in New Trust Laws, PROB. & 
PROP., Jan./Feb. 1998, at 32; Todd Spangler, Delaware Again 1st in Trusts, ANCHORAGE DAILY 
NEWS, July 29, 1997, at F1. 
81.  See NEV. REV. STAT. § 166.040(1)(b) (2003); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 31, §§ 10-18 (West Supp. 
2005); R.I. GEN. LAWS § 18-9.2-1 to -5 (2003); 2005 S.D. Sess. Laws, ch. 261 (to be codified at 
S.D. CODIFIED LAWS §§ 55-16-1 to -16); UTAH CODE ANN. § 25-6-14 (Supp. 2005). Some 
commentators have read an older statute in Colorado as authorizing APTs as to future 
creditors, see COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 38-10-111 (West 2000), but in dicta the Colorado 
Supreme Court has rejected that interpretation. In re Cohen, 8 P.3d 429, 432-34 (Colo. 
1999). In 1986 Missouri amended its statutory rules on spendthrift trusts in a manner that 
could be read to authorize APTs, see MO. ANN. STAT. § 456.080 (West 1992) (repealed 
2004), but there is some contrary case law and the literature tends not to regard Missouri as 
an APT jurisdiction. See Markmueller v. Case, 51 F.3d 775 (8th Cir. 1995); John K. Eason, 
Retirement Security Through Asset Protection: The Evolution of Wealth, Privilege, and Policy, 61 
WASH. & LEE L. REV. 159, 174 n.54 (2004). Hence we code neither Colorado nor Missouri as 
APT jurisdictions. In 2004 Missouri adopted a nonuniform version of Uniform Trust Code 
section 505 that took effect on January 1, 2005, see MO. ANN. STAT. §§ 456.5 to 505.3 (West 
Supp. 2005), and its drafters intended specifically to authorize APTs. See James G. Blase, 
The Missouri Asset Protection Trust, J. MO. B., Mar.-Apr. 2005, at 72. Whether the new 
Missouri statute in fact authorizes APTs does not bear on this study because the new statute 
took effect after the timeframe of our data. 
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Figure 2. 
self-settled asset protection states (2005) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Similar legislation has been introduced in other states.82 Many of the APT 
statutes condition their applicability on the appointment of an in-state trustee.83 
But even if a state’s APT statute does not require naming an in-state trustee, a 
well-advised settlor will do so anyway to increase the odds that courts in other 
states will respect the trust’s choice-of-law provision.84 
The political dynamic driving the validation of APTs is similar to that which 
drives the movement to abolish the Rule Against Perpetuities. Local banks and 
lawyers, who stand to benefit from an influx of trust assets, are the principal 
supporters of APTs. But where the abolition of the Rule Against Perpetuities is 
driven by the desire of settlors to provide a transfer-tax-exempt trust for future 
 
82.  See, e.g., Qualified Dispositions Trust Act, Assemb. 2173, 226th Ann. Leg., Reg. Sess. (N.Y. 
2003). 
83.  See DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 12, § 3570(9) (2001); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 31, § 11 (West Supp. 
2005); R.I. GEN. LAWS § 18-9.2-2(8) (2003); 2005 S.D. Sess. Laws, ch. 261, §§ 3-4 (to be 
codified at S.D. CODIFIED LAWS §§ 55-16-3 to -4); UTAH CODE ANN. § 25-6-14(1)(a) (Supp. 
2005). 
84.  See supra text accompanying notes 55-61. 
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generations, it is the settlor’s personal liability exposure that drives the APT 
market. For example, there is anecdotal evidence that, in the face of rising 
premiums, some doctors have opted to drop their malpractice insurance 
altogether in favor of moving their assets into APTs (this is the motivation for 
Case 4, above).85 Indeed, the validation of APTs is sometimes defended on the 
ground that tort liability is “out of control.”86 On this account, APTs “might be 
reckoned as the revenge of the trust lawyers against the tort lawyers.”87 
It remains to be seen whether the courts of states that adhere to the traditional 
rule will respect domestic APTs.88 In spite of this uncertainty, however, validation 
of APTs is a potentially important distinguishing feature of state law in the 
jurisdictional competition for trust funds. To the extent that an APT gives the 
settlor additional leverage in settlement negotiations with creditors, an APT has 
 
85.  See Rachel Emma Silverman, Litigation Boom Spurs Efforts To Shield Assets, WALL ST. J., Oct. 
14, 2003, at D1; Rachel Emma Silverman, So Sue Me: Doctors Without Insurance, WALL ST. J., 
Jan. 28, 2004, at D1. 
86.  Roundtable Discussion, 32 VAND. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 779, 792-93 (1999) (statement of Eric 
Henzy). 
87.  DUKEMINIER ET AL., supra note 5, at 558. 
88.  Although there are not yet any definitive appellate decisions involving domestic APTs, there 
is a cautionary scholarly literature that explores bankruptcy law, fraudulent conveyance law, 
choice-of-law rules, federal constitutional considerations (such as the Full Faith and Credit 
Clause), and other doctrinal bases for refusing enforcement. This literature also takes on the 
normative policy question. See, e.g., Karen E. Boxx, Gray’s Ghost—A Conversation About the 
Onshore Trust, 85 IOWA L. REV. 1195 (2000); John K. Eason, Developing the Asset Protection 
Dynamic: A Legacy of Federal Concern, 31 HOFSTRA L. REV. 23 (2002); Randall J. Gingiss, 
Putting a Stop to “Asset Protection” Trusts, 51 BAYLOR L. REV. 987 (1999); Henry J. Lischer, 
Jr., Domestic Asset Protection Trusts: Pallbearers to Liability?, 35 REAL PROP. PROB. & TR. J. 479 
(2000); Sterk, supra note 33. For a contrary academic view, see Robert T. Danforth, 
Rethinking the Law of Creditors’ Rights in Trusts, 53 HASTINGS L.J. 287 (2002). There are also 
numerous articles by or for practitioners. See, e.g., John E. Sullivan III, Gutting the Rule 
Against Self-Settled Trusts: How the New Delaware Trust Law Competes with Offshore Trusts, 23 
DEL. J. CORP. L. 423 (1998); Melanie Leslie, Asset Protection Trusts Find a Home in the United 
States, N.Y. L.J., Feb. 14, 2005, at S1; David G. Shaftel & David H. Bundy, Domestic Asset 
Protection Trusts Created by Nonresident Settlors, EST. PLAN., Apr. 2005, at 17; David G. Shaftel 
& David H. Bundy, Impact of New Bankruptcy Provision on Domestic Asset Protection Trusts, 
EST. PLAN., July, 2005, at 28. Offshore APTs have met with considerable judicial hostility, 
see, e.g., In re Lawrence, 279 F.3d 1294 (11th Cir. 2002); FTC v. Affordable Media, LLC, 179 
F.3d 1228 (9th Cir. 1999), though some view these cases as cautionary tales on how not to 
draft an offshore trust. See Alexander A. Bove, Jr., Drafting Offshore Trusts, TR. & EST., July 
2004, at 44, 45-46. 
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value, although just how much is uncertain.89 Thus, as with the abrogation of the 
Rule Against Perpetuities, validation of APTs has the potential to attract trust 
funds. We code for APTs as summarized in Table 5. 
2. Fiduciary Income Taxes 
Suppose O, a prospective settlor who resides in state A, wants the law of 
state B to govern the administration and validity of her trust. As we have seen, 
to achieve this end O will often be advised not only to designate in the trust 
instrument that the law of state B is to govern, but also to name a bank or trust 
company located in state B as trustee.90 In doing so, a relevant concern to the 
settlor is whether as a result state B will levy a tax on the trust’s income. Such a 
tax is called a fiduciary income tax (FIT) because the fiduciary is responsible 
for filing the return and paying the tax. 
To ascertain whether differences in state FIT regimes affect the location of 
trust funds, we must first attend to the federal taxation of trust income, under 
which trusts are treated as conduit or passthrough entities.91 Income 
distributed to a beneficiary in the year it is received is taxable to the beneficiary, 
not to the trust; income that is not so distributed is taxable to the trust, not the 
beneficiary. Hence, from the perspective of minimizing federal income taxes, 
trust income should be distributed or accumulated depending on the relative 
applicable tax rates. 
In the period under study, the rates applicable to individuals were 
significantly lower than those applicable to trusts.92 Indeed, as Jeffrey Pennell 
has remarked, the rates applicable to trusts “by far are the most onerous 
applicable to any taxpayer under the Code.”93 The Internal Revenue Code thus 
 
89.  Eric Henzy, who represented the plaintiff in In re Brooks, 217 B.R. 98 (Bankr. D. Conn. 
1998), explained: “In Brooks we got a judgment essentially voiding this offshore trust. We 
then settled for approximately fifty cents on the dollar, because the enforcement problems 
were so significant.” Roundtable Discussion, supra note 86, at 786 (statement of Eric Henzy). 
90.  See supra text accompanying notes 55-61. 
91.  See Jeffrey G. Sherman, All You Really Need To Know About Subchapter J You Learned from 
This Article, 63 MO. L. REV. 1, 12 (1998). 
92.  See Sherman, supra note 91, at 5, 37-38; [1987] 1 Stand. Fed. Tax Rep. (CCH) ¶ 421.05, at 
10,052. The current rates are stated in 26 U.S.C.S. § 1(a)-(d) (LexisNexis 2005) for 
individuals and 26 U.S.C.S. §1(e) (LexisNexis 2005) for estates and trusts. 
93.  PENNELL, supra note 15, ch. 17, at 2. 
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creates an incentive for trust income to be distributed to the beneficiary in the 
year it is received.94 
States that levy a FIT tend to follow a similar conduit model.95 As a result, 
for many trusts state FITs are avoided in the course of avoiding federal income 
taxes. We therefore hypothesize that, by itself, whether a state levies a FIT on 
trust funds attracted from out of state will have little to no observable effect on 
trust fund location.96 
Unlike an ordinary trust, however, a transfer-tax-exempt perpetual trust 
has a different duration and purpose that might warrant accumulation of 
income notwithstanding the federal income tax penalty. Income accumulated 
in a transfer-tax-exempt trust is exempt from subsequent wealth transfer 
taxation, but such income loses its exempt status upon distribution to a 
beneficiary. The federal income tax penalty is not trivial, but it is less than the 
current 47% top rate of the federal transfer taxes. In contrast to the income tax, 
which reduces the trust’s rate of growth, the transfer taxes eat into the corpus 
of the trust. Hence, for a transfer-tax-exempt perpetual trust, it may be a 
sensible long-term strategy to incur a present income tax liability to avoid a 
bigger future transfer tax bill. Further, unless some income is retained, the 
trust will lose value because of inflation, a significant consideration if the 
trust’s purpose is to provide a fund for future generations. 
Although a settlor cannot avoid the federal income tax penalty by switching 
states, she can avoid piling on state income taxes by choosing a state that does 
not tax income in trusts attracted from out of state. Accordingly, we predict 
that the effect of the abolition of the Rule will be magnified in states that do 
not tax income in trust funds attracted from out of state. Once the settlor has 
committed to incurring the costs of settling an out-of-state trust, the marginal 
 
94.  See MCGOVERN & KURTZ, supra note 28, § 15.5, at 705. Even if the trustee has discretion not 
to make distributions, the trustee’s duty of prudence requires reasonable efforts to minimize 
taxes. See Mark L. Ascher, The Fiduciary Duty To Minimize Taxes, 20 REAL PROP. PROB. & 
TR. J. 663 (1985). 
95.  MAX GUTIERREZ, JR. & FREDERICK R. KEYDEL, AM. COLL. OF TRUSTS & ESTATES COUNSEL, 
STUDY 6: STATE TAXATION ON INCOME OF TRUSTS WITH MULTI-STATE CONTACTS 12 (2001); 
Bradley E.S. Fogel, What Have You Done for Me Lately? Constitutional Limitations on State 
Taxation of Trusts, 32 U. RICH. L. REV. 165, 173-74 (1998). 
96.  Further, the trustee may deduct state income taxes in figuring the trust’s federal income tax. 
But a deduction is not the same as a credit—a consideration that, for the reasons discussed 
in the next paragraph, is likely to be of greater significance for a transfer-tax-exempt 
perpetual trust. See also Bradley E.S. Fogel, State Income Taxation of Trusts, PROB. & PROP. 
July/Aug. 2005, at 36 (examining state taxation of accumulations in trust). 
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cost of choosing a state that will not levy a FIT on the trust’s income is close to 
zero but the benefits are potentially significant. 
Each state has a “unique matrix of statutory rules” setting forth what 
contacts with the state will trigger FIT liability.97 Based on our examination of 
the FIT statutes of all fifty states from 1985 through 2004, we have coded each 
state as YES or NO for each year, pursuant to the following standards: 
Relevant FITs are those that would be levied on income in a trust (1) consisting 
entirely of financial assets (in the jargon, intangible personal property) that is 
(2) settled by a nonresident (3) for the benefit of a nonresident. Moreover, such 
taxes are relevant only if they would be triggered even if the trust’s only contact 
with the state is (a) an in-state trustee, (b) in-state administration, or (c) in-
state situs. We have used these standards because they characterize the 
paradigmatic trust fund attracted from out of state, and our estimation strategy 
measures relative increases in the states’ reported trust assets. Settling an out-
of-state trust with an out-of-state trustee is the primary method of avoiding 
state FITs other than changing the settlor’s or the beneficiary’s state of 
residence. For the rest of this Article, when we speak of state taxation of income 
in trusts attracted from out of state, we refer to the six conditions stated above. 
In the absence of clarifying regulations or case law, we resolved statutory 
ambiguity in favor of YES. 
Our FIT coding, which is consistent with the methodology of Jeffrey 
Schoenblum’s annual Multistate Guide to Estate Planning,98 is summarized in 
Table 5. There is variation across states and some variation across time, which 
allows us to test the importance of FITs on their own as well as their interactive 
effect with abolition of the Rule Against Perpetuities. 
ii. description of the data set 
A. Data Sources 
The trust data (state-level panel data) come from annual reports collected 
by the four federal agencies charged with banking regulation: (1) the Federal 
Deposit Insurance Corporation (FDIC); (2) the Federal Reserve System; (3) 
the Office of Thrift Supervision (which superseded the Federal Home Loan 
Bank Board); and (4) the Office of the Comptroller of the Currency. All banks 
 
97.  JEFFREY A. SCHOENBLUM, 2004 MULTISTATE GUIDE TO ESTATE PLANNING 11-1 (2004). 
98.  See id. at 11-2 to -17 tbl.11.01. 
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and other financial institutions that are regulated by these agencies must file 
annual reports detailing their trust holdings, including total assets and number 
of accounts.99 Based on this data, from 1968 until 2001 the Federal Financial 
Institutions Research Council published annual reports of trust holdings by 
regulated entities, summarizing the results by state.100 Since 2001, the FDIC 
has been publishing these reports (now available online) organized by 
individual institution and by state.101 
The trust holdings of regulated entities are reported in categories entitled 
“Employee Benefit,” “Personal Trusts,” and “Estates.” We examine only 
“Personal Trusts,” a category that includes both private and charitable trusts 
(both testamentary and inter vivos), but that excludes commercial trusts and 
employee benefit plans. Prior to 1985, federal authorities only collected 
information on actively managed personal trusts (meaning trusts for which the 
regulated entity had discretionary investment authority), and neither savings-
and-loan institutions nor savings banks with trust powers were required to 
report.102 To ensure consistency we use only data from 1985 onward.103 
In some specifications, we include additional variables from yearly 
estimates of state population and personal income.104 
 
99.  Federal statutes make these filings mandatory. 12 U.S.C. § 1817 (2000) (FDIC); id. §§ 
248(a), 1844(a) (Federal Reserve System); id. § 1464 (Office of Thrift Supervision); id. §§ 
161, 1817 (Office of Comptroller of the Currency). 
100.  See, e.g., FED. FIN. INSTS. EXAMINATION COUNCIL, TRUST ASSETS OF FINANCIAL 
INSTITUTIONS-1987 (1987). 
101.  An interactive website allows one to obtain new data, state by state. See FDIC: Statistics on 
Depository Institutions, http://www2.fdic.gov/sdi/main.asp (last visited Sept. 3, 2005). 
Older reports, from 1996 through 2000, may also be obtained. See FFIEC: Trust 
Institutions Information, http://www2.fdic.gov/structur/trust/index.asp (last visited Sept. 
3, 2005). 
102.  For a discussion, see FED. FIN. INSTS. EXAMINATION COUNCIL, supra note 100, at 2. 
103.  Most states that abolished the RAP did so beginning in the mid-1990s. Hence, limiting our 
study to the years since 1985 provides a sufficient number of pre-abolition observations. We 
also have two years of observations prior to the Tax Reform Act of 1986. We examine the 
data from 1969 through 1984 in a separate study. See Schanzenbach & Sitkoff, supra note 13. 
104.  See Population Estimate Archives, http://www.census.gov/popest/archives (last visited 
Sept. 3, 2005) (providing yearly state population estimates); Bureau of Economic Analysis: 
Regional Economic Accounts, http://www.bea.gov/bea/regional/statelocal.htm (last visited 
Sept. 3, 2005) (providing yearly state personal income estimates). Income estimates are 
given quarterly. We used the estimates in the December reports because the reporting 
institutions reported trust assets at year end. 
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B. Brief Treatment of Data Limitations 
In Appendix A, we provide a treatment of the limitations of our data. In 
this Section, we examine the most serious concern about the data, namely, 
whether recent bank mergers and consolidations exaggerated the movement in 
trust assets that we observe. 
Effective in 1997, the Riegle-Neal Interstate Banking and Branching 
Efficiency Act of 1994105 made it much easier for banks and bank holding 
companies to convert independently chartered banks in different states into 
branch offices of a single interstate bank.106 Interstate bank mergers or branch 
consolidations have the potential to bias our results because the data are 
collected by institution, not by state. For example, if a bank consolidated after 
1997 by converting its independently chartered offices in state A into a branch 
of its headquarters bank chartered in state B, then trust assets formerly 
reported as held in state A would from that point forward be reported as held 
by the headquarters bank in state B. Mergers could have the same effect. If a 
bank chartered in state A acquired a bank chartered in state B and then 
converted the acquired bank into a branch, the accounts formerly reported as 
held in state B would be reported as held in state A. 
Although important to consider, the Riegle-Neal Act does not present a 
significant impediment to our study. For mergers to bias our results upward 
(that is, to produce a false positive), a bank in an abolition state would have to 
acquire a bank in a RAP state and then report the acquired bank’s trust assets 
as held in the abolition state. Using a list of all bank mergers since 1991 in 
which the acquired bank had total assets more than $20 billion,107 we identified 
only one merger of a bank from a RAP state into an abolition state—the 1995 
 
105.  Pub. L. No. 103-328, 108 Stat. 2338 (1994) (codified at 12 U.S.C. § 1811 (2000)); see Patrick 
Mulloy & Cynthia Lasker, The Riegle-Neal Interstate Banking and Branching Efficiency Act of 
1994: Responding to Global Competition, 21 J. LEGIS. 255, 270-72 (1995). 
106.  Prior to 1997, banks could maintain interstate branches under narrow circumstances, but a 
study conducted by the Federal Reserve found that few banks did so. Susan McLaughlin, 
The Impact of Interstate Banking and Branching Reform: Evidence from the States (Fed. Res. 
Bank of N.Y., Current Issues in Econ. & Fin. Vol. 1, No. 2, 1995), available at 
http://www.ny.frb.org/research/current_issues/ci1-2.pdf. It is possible that noninsured 
entities (such as nondeposit trust companies) could have created interstate branches prior to 
1997. However, we estimate that such institutions account for only 3% to 4% of institutions 
in the sample and only about 6% of total assets. 
107.  Robert DeYoung & Thomas Klier, Why BankOne Left Chicago: One Piece in a Bigger Puzzle 3 
tbl.3 (Fed. Res. Bank of Chi., Chi. Fed. Letter No. 201, 2004), available at 
http://www.chicagofed.org/publications/fedletter/cflapril2004_201.pdf. 
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merger of Shawmut National, headquartered in Massachusetts, with Fleet 
Financial, headquartered in Rhode Island.108 For this reason, we exclude 
observations from Massachusetts and Rhode Island for the affected years. We 
also run a specification that excludes these two states for all years, and the 
results are not meaningfully different. In addition, a recent Federal Reserve 
study found that bank headquarters have been moving from small cities to 
larger cities (particularly New York City) over the 1990s,109 but most of the 
abolition states are small and lack large cities. 
As a further check, we also use average account size as a dependent variable. 
Average account size is computed by dividing total reported assets in a state by 
the number of reported accounts in that state. A swing up or down in reported 
assets caused by a merger should be correlated with a corresponding swing up 
or down in the number of accounts. Thus, average account size should be less 
sensitive than total assets to distortion from mergers or branching. Average 
account size is also a meaningful variable in its own right for reasons we 
discuss in the empirical analysis below. 
iii. empirical analysis 
Our analysis of the data proceeds in three steps. First, in Section A we 
present an initial discussion of the raw data. In leading states such as South 
Dakota, Delaware, and Illinois, the effect of abolishing the Rule is so profound 
that simple graphical depictions are highly suggestive. Second, in Sections B 
and C we present a formal econometric analysis that employs a standard 
differences-in-differences regression methodology that controls for 
contemporaneous changes in state law and relevant economic factors. Third, in 
Section D we offer a nontechnical synthesis of our findings. Readers interested 
in our results, but not in the formal methodology, will find Sections A and D of 
principal interest. 
 
108.  In 1998, the same year that Illinois abolished the RAP, First Bank of Chicago and BankOne 
of Columbus, Ohio merged, with the headquarters remaining in Chicago. However, based 
on institution-level data for 2001 obtained from the FDIC’s website, it appears that First 
Bank continued to report as an Ohio bank, and Ohio abolished the RAP in 1999. There were 
some significant mergers between control states (California and North Carolina, for 
example), which caused substantial swings between those states in reported assets. But as 
these mergers simply shifted money between control states, they should not have an effect 
on our coefficient estimates. 
109.  See DeYoung & Klier, supra note 107, at 3. 
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A. Initial Data Analysis 
Figure 3 presents reported trust assets and average account sizes from 1985 
through 2003 based on raw numbers and without an adjustment for inflation. 
Trust assets and average account sizes track each other closely, rising every year 
in a fairly smooth linear trend until 2000, followed by a sizeable dip in 2001 
(which may reflect stock market fluctuations).110 
Figure 3. 
total reported trust assets and average account size 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
In the next five graphs we compare trends in reported trust assets in 
leading abolition states to each other, their neighboring states, and national 
averages. Because differences in population and local economies make 
graphical comparisons of total assets across states almost meaningless, in our 
comparisons we use trust assets per person or average account size. Dividing 
total assets by state population reduces the influence of population and 
highlights the success of small states such as Delaware and South Dakota. 
 
110.  A cursory glance at this and the subsequent state-level graphs suggests that in some states 
trust fund values are sensitive to fluctuations in public equities markets. We are in the 
process of testing this hypothesis as part of a separate empirical study of trust asset 
allocation and reform of prudent investor laws. 
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Dividing total assets by number of accounts (that is, average account size) 
likewise facilitates comparison across states. In addition, average account size is 
an important variable in its own right for two reasons. First, average account 
size is less sensitive than total assets to the potential biasing effect of bank 
mergers and consolidations. Second, because the current exemption from the 
GST tax is $1.5 million and for much of the period under study was $1 million, 
an upswing in average account size above those figures implies not only an 
influx of trust assets but also that a fair amount of those assets are not transfer-
tax exempt. 
Figure 4 presents trust assets per person in the important abolition states of 
Delaware and South Dakota in comparison with New York, a leading banking 
state, and with the national average. Delaware abolished the RAP in 1995, and 
South Dakota abolished the RAP in 1983, prior to the start of our data. As can 
be seen, South Dakota started out with trust assets per person just below the 
national average at the beginning of the sample timeframe. By the mid-1990s, 
however, South Dakota’s assets per person exceeded the national average and 
equaled or exceeded that of New York. 
Having long been a trust-friendly jurisdiction,111 Delaware’s trust assets per 
person began at a very high level (with an unexplained blip in 1991 and 1992, 
prior to abolition), then experienced a strong upward trend in the mid-1990s, 
roughly coinciding with Delaware’s abolition of the RAP. We have no good 
explanation for the 1991-1992 blip. Given Delaware’s otherwise smooth 
upward trend, we could interpolate the data for 1991 and 1992. However, this 
unexplained increase in trust assets occurred prior to Delaware’s abolition of 
the RAP. As such, if included in our analysis, it would tend to bias our estimate 
of the effect of abolishing the Rule downward, working against a positive 
finding. For this reason, we have chosen the more conservative approach of 
accepting the data as reported by the FDIC. 
 
111.  See supra note 62. 
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Figure 4. 
reported trust assets per person in delaware, new york, and south dakota 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
In the next few graphs we compare average account sizes in Delaware, 
South Dakota, and Illinois (another important abolition state112) to their 
neighboring states. We do so for illustrative purposes only. All states, not just 
those that are geographically proximate to abolishing states, are included in the 
formal econometric analysis. We begin in Figure 5 with a comparison of 
Delaware to Maryland, Pennsylvania, and New York. Delaware and New York 
started out with similar average account sizes, but Delaware rapidly outpaced 
New York in the mid-1990s, roughly coincident with the abolition of the RAP 
in Delaware. Neither Pennsylvania nor Maryland was in the same league as 
Delaware. Even after the precipitous drop in average account size in Delaware 
following the stock market decline of the early 2000s, Delaware’s average trust 
account size at the end of our sample timeframe was about double that in 
Pennsylvania and Maryland. Although Maryland abolished the Rule in 1998, 
 
112.  Illinois banks and lawyers have been particularly effective at securing law reform. For 
example, Illinois was one of the first states to revise its trust investment law in light of 
modern portfolio theory, see John H. Langbein, The Uniform Prudent Investor Act and the 
Future of Trust Investing, 81 IOWA L. REV. 641, 641-42 (1996), and Illinois statutory law 
proscribes the preparation of an inter vivos trust by anyone other than a lawyer or 
institutional trustee, 815 ILL. COMP. STAT. § 505/2BB (1999). 
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since 1988 it has levied a fiduciary income tax on trust funds attracted from out 
of state. We posit that aversion to this tax explains Maryland’s inability to 
compete with Delaware. The econometric analysis below supports this 
hypothesis. 
Figure 5. 
average account size in delaware and comparison states 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
South Dakota, which we examine in Figure 6, presents a clearer picture. In 
the mid-1980s, South Dakota’s average account size was slightly larger than 
North Dakota’s and Iowa’s. The gap between the states then began to grow 
after 1987, with the implementation of the GST tax, and increased notably in 
the mid-1990s. This latter increase coincided with the abolition of the RAP in 
Delaware and the subsequent nationwide movement to abolish the RAP. In 
addition, at about the same time the Governor of South Dakota formed a task 
force to study the South Dakota trust laws and to recommend reforms to allow 
South Dakota to continue its position as “a highly desirable jurisdiction in 
which to locate trusts.”113 
 
113.  Michael J. Myers & Rollyn H. Samp, South Dakota Trust Amendments and Economic 
Development: The Tort of “Negligent Trust Situs” at Its Incipient Stage?, 44 S.D. L. REV. 662, 
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Figure 6. 
average account size in south dakota and comparison states 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Illinois, which we examine in  Figure 7, abolished the RAP in 1998. Average 
account size in Illinois increased by roughly 70% two years later, from $1.4 
million to nearly $2.5 million. This increased average account size remained 
stable even in the face of the stock market decline of the early 2000s (which is 
consistent with a continued influx of assets). Chicago is a significant banking 
center and home to the prominent Northern Trust Company.114 
 
664 (1999) (quoting State of South Dakota, Office of the Governor, Exec. Order No. 97-10 
(Aug. 11, 1997)). 
114.  Because of the large and relatively immediate effect of abolition on average account size in 
Illinois, the reader may be concerned that our results are driven entirely by Illinois. 
However, as illustrated by Figure 8, infra, the swift increase in Illinois merely brought 
Illinois up from the national average to an average account size comparable to that of New 
York and Delaware. Further, in unreported regressions excluding Illinois, we find that our 
estimate of the effect of abolition remains statistically significant at the 5% level. 
SITKOFF & SCHANZENBACH  FINAL 11/21/2005  6:55:00 PM 
the yale law journal 115:356   2005  
396 
 
$
$500
$1000
$1500
$2000
$2500
$3000
19
85
19
87
19
89
19
91
19
93
19
95
19
97
19
99
20
01
20
03
year
va
lu
e i
n 
th
ou
sa
nd
s
Illinois Michigan Wisconsin
Illinois abolishes 
the RAP
Figure 7. 
average account size in illinois and comparison states 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Interestingly, Wisconsin, which abolished the RAP long before the 
introduction of the GST tax, appears to have been unable to compete with 
Illinois. As in the case of Delaware and Maryland, we posit that the disparity 
between Illinois and Wisconsin is a result of their different FIT rules. During 
the period under study, Illinois did not tax income in trust funds attracted 
from out of state, but for most years Wisconsin did. The econometric analysis 
below supports this hypothesis. 
Another interesting implication of Figure 7 is that after Illinois abolished 
the RAP its trust institutions experienced an influx of large trusts that were 
probably not wholly transfer-tax-exempt. The exemption from the GST and 
estate taxes is currently $1.5 million and for most of the period under study was 
$1 million. Yet average account size in Illinois rose quickly from less than $1.5 
million to about $2.5 million after the RAP was abolished. The implication is 
that a fair number of the new accounts were worth more than $1.5 million. To 
the extent that the initial funding of such trusts exceeded $1 or $1.5 million, the 
excess is subject to federal wealth transfer taxation. In a similar vein, observe 
that Delaware, like Illinois, experienced a rapid increase in its average account 
size, which at the time Delaware abolished the RAP already exceeded the 
exemption amount (see Figure 5 above and Figure 8 below). 
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We conjecture that the inflow of very large accounts reflects the 
administrative efficiencies of locating all of one’s trust assets in a single account 
with one institutional trustee. Under typical fee schedules, larger accounts pay 
a smaller percentage in fees relative to smaller accounts,115 and professional 
fiduciaries are willing to negotiate even lower fees for (and to give more 
personal service to) larger accounts.116 On this view the availability of perpetual 
transfer-tax-exempt trusts provides an opening to attract all of the donor’s 
trust business. 
In Figure 8, we compare average account sizes in Delaware, Illinois, New 
York, South Dakota, and the national average. Many of the trends remarked 
above are again discernible. The trend in average trust account size in Delaware 
roughly tracked that of New York until Delaware abolished the RAP in 1995, 
whereupon Delaware outpaced New York in all subsequent years. Average 
account size in South Dakota, which had abolished the RAP prior to the 
enactment of the GST tax, trailed the national average until the mid-1990s. By 
1998, when Illinois abolished its RAP, South Dakota caught up to the national 
average. Average account size in Illinois, which prior to 1998 more or less 
tracked the national average, broke away and substantially outpaced the 
national average from that point forward, catching up with New York in 2000 
and Delaware in 2002. 
 
115.  The June 2004 fee schedule for the Chicago-based Northern Trust Company is as follows: a 
minimum annual fee of $12,500 for any size trust up to $1 million, plus 0.80% for the next 
$2 million; 0.70% for the next $2 million; 0.50% for the next $5 million; 0.45% for the next 
$5 million; 0.45% for the next $15 million; and 0.40% for the next $25 million. N. TRUST 
CO., PERSONAL TRUST SERVICES: SCHEDULE OF FEES (2003) (on file with authors). Under 
this schedule the annual fee for a $3 million trust would be $28,500 and for a $10 million 
trust would be $67,500. The prominent Wilmington Trust Company, located in Delaware, 
has similar published rates: a minimum annual fee of $10,000 for any size trust up to $1 
million, plus 1% of the next $1 million; 0.75% for the next $3 million; 0.50% for the next $5 
million; and 0.35% for the next $10 million. WILMINGTON TRUST, SCHEDULE OF FEES (2004) 
(on file with authors). 
116.  See Robert Frank, Rich, Richer, Richest: Private Banks’ Class System, WALL ST. J., Sept. 8, 
2004, at D1; see also WILMINGTON TRUST, supra note 115 (indicating that fees on accounts in 
excess of $20 million are individually negotiated). 
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Figure 8. 
average account size in delaware, illinois, new york, and south dakota 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
In our view, the foregoing graphs support the hypothesis that those states 
that abolished the RAP and did not tax income in trusts attracted from out of 
state experienced a significant inflow of large trust funds upon abolishing the 
Rule. This hypothesis is borne out in the econometric analysis below. 
These data also suggest that the abolition of the Rule Against Perpetuities 
prior to the introduction of the GST tax had no observable effect on a state’s 
trust assets. Recall that Idaho (1957), Wisconsin (1969),117 and South Dakota 
(1983) abolished the RAP prior to the 1986 enactment of the GST tax, and that 
throughout this period South Dakota did not have a FIT. Yet in 1985 and 1986, 
the two years prior to the GST tax that are included in our sample timeframe, 
 
117.  Wisconsin may have abolished its Rule even earlier (indeed, Wisconsin may never have had 
the Rule). See Lawrence M. Friedman, The Dynastic Trust, 73 YALE L.J. 547, 550 (1964); W. 
Barton Leach, Perpetuities: The Nutshell Revisited, 78 HARV. L. REV. 973, 974-75 (1965). We 
need not resolve the status of the Rule in Wisconsin prior to 1985, however, because our 
data do not begin until that year. 
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the average account size in each of these states closely matched those of its 
neighboring states and trailed the national average. 
Let us examine the numbers directly, looking first at the early abolition 
states in comparison with their neighbors. In Wisconsin, average account size 
in 1985 and 1986 was below that of surrounding states. In South Dakota, 
average account size in 1985 and 1986 was slightly ahead of North Dakota and 
Iowa. In Idaho, which is not graphed above, average account size was $224,000 
in 1985 and $211,000 in 1986, comparable to its neighbor Montana, which had 
average trust sizes of $180,000 in 1985 and $220,000 in 1986. 
Turning to comparison with the national average, in 1985 the average 
account size nationally was $393,000, while average account sizes in Idaho, 
South Dakota, and Wisconsin were $224,000, $228,000, and $257,000, 
respectively. In 1986, the figures were $448,000 nationally, and $211,000, 
$237,000, and $275,000, respectively, in Idaho, South Dakota, and Wisconsin. 
Similar results obtain if we consider trust assets per person. There is little 
evidence, therefore, that people valued perpetual trusts prior to the GST tax. 
Accordingly, we infer that without the GST tax incentive to act as a wedge, few 
individuals would establish perpetual trusts. Our analysis of the data from 
1969 through 1984, which we present in a forthcoming study, strongly 
supports this conclusion.118 
B. The Estimation Strategy 
We estimate the effect of abolishing the RAP using four different 
dependent variables and several model specifications. We examine the effect of 
the abolition of the rule on total trust assets (Table 1), log trust assets (Table 
2), average account size (Table 3), and total number of accounts (Table 4). We 
also consider trust assets per person in Appendix B. 
 
118.  See Schanzenbach & Sitkoff, supra note 13. For this reason, we do not code the RAP as 
abolished in South Dakota, Idaho, or Wisconsin prior to the introduction of the GST tax. 
Technically, we should code these states as abolition states prior to 1987 and then interact 
the effect of the GST tax with the abolition dummy. However, this would leave only six 
identifying observations in the main effect. In addition, there were no statistically significant 
differences between these and other states in trust assets, average account size, or assets per 
person prior to 1987, which leads us to conclude that the effect of the abolition of the RAP is 
driven by the GST tax. See id. The results differ little in either case but are slightly more 
significant if we code all pre-GST years as nonabolition years. 
SITKOFF & SCHANZENBACH  FINAL 11/21/2005  6:55:00 PM 
the yale law journal 115:356   2005  
400 
 
The most straightforward specification is a simple before-and-after 
comparison using a dummy variable equaling one after a state abolishes the 
RAP and zero otherwise. This specification takes the form: 
Specification 1. 
Trust Assetsjt = αConstant + λYeart + ψStatej + ηAbolishjt + Ejt 
 
where j indexes state and t indexes time. The variable Abolish equals one 
beginning the year after a state abolishes the RAP. The coefficient η gives a 
simple before-after comparison of the effect of abolition. Some states abolished 
the RAP early in the year, others did so late in the year. Given the reality that it 
takes time to draft new trust forms and for clients to execute them, we begin 
counting a state as having abolished the RAP in the first year after the year of 
abolition. (The results when we included the year of abolition were slightly 
weaker, but little-changed.) Year represents a matrix of year dummies, which 
remove the effects of market fluctuations, inflation, and economic growth. 
State represents a matrix of state dummies, which remove state average 
differences. Therefore, every model conditions on state and year fixed effects, 
which means that the effect of abolition on the state’s trust business is 
measured relative to the state and year average. 
The simple differences-in-differences specification described above is open 
to a few potential biases. The states that abolish the Rule may be the states that 
are most responsive to the demands of local banks and trust lawyers. Hence, 
these states may have adopted other reforms simultaneously. To account for 
this possibility, we add controls for two other important margins in the 
jurisdictional competition for trust funds: (1) the recognition of APTs, and (2) 
whether a state levies an income tax on trust funds attracted from out of state. 
In the hope of throwing light on the Waggoner/Dukeminier debate over 
USRAP, we also (3) add a control for whether a state adopted USRAP.119 
We also account for two other factors that may lead to state differences: 
population and individual income. Larger and wealthier populations will tend 
to have more and larger trusts. We therefore add yearly census estimates to 
control for state population and, as a proxy for wealth, yearly estimated state-
aggregate personal income. 
 
119.  Because of the merger and branching issues discussed above, the coefficient estimates on 
these controls may be biased when aggregate trust assets and number of accounts are 
considered and should be interpreted cautiously. For the reasons detailed earlier, we are 
more confident of the results when we consider average account sizes. 
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Another concern is that secular trends in states that abolished the RAP 
might cause a positive finding.120 We therefore include state-specific linear 
time trends in some specifications. Yet another way to test for biasing trends is 
to include dummy variables for the years prior to the abolition of the RAP. In 
some specifications we include dummies for two years prior to abolition, the 
year before abolition, and the year of abolition. 
In Specification 1 and its variants, we code Abolish as a dummy variable, 
which would accurately reflect the effect of abolition only if abolition results in 
an immediate and discrete jump in assets. Hence Specification 1 imposes a 
strong functional form on the effect of abolishing the RAP, which may be ill-
suited to the phenomenon for at least two reasons. First, to digest the change 
in the law and to sell the new product to clients takes time. The GST tax and 
the Rule Against Perpetuities are complex, and the interaction of the two was 
not immediately obvious. 
Second, because existing trusts in nonabolition states are drafted to comply 
with the Rule,121 and because moving a trust often requires judicial approval, 
the phenomenon is probably driven by new trust funds rather than the 
movement of existing trusts. If so, the effect of abolition will be gradual as new 
trusts are created and accumulate. Specification 1, however, assumes a perfectly 
liquid market in trust funds with no transaction costs and no agency costs 
between lawyers and clients.122 
A further problem with the assumptions underpinning Specification 1 is 
that as additional states abolished the RAP beginning in the mid-1990s, the 
competition for trust business became fiercer. With an increasing number of 
perpetual trust jurisdictions, the payoff to abolition might well shrink 
(eventually the payoff might be more in the nature of retaining assets than 
attracting them123). If so, the effect of abolition may decrease over time. With 
these factors in mind, we allow the effect of reform to increase and decrease 
over time by entering a quadratic term for reform as follows: 
 
120.  By “secular trends” we mean general time trends that are not explained by any of the 
available independent variables. 
121.  See Sterk, supra note 33, at 2117 n.81. 
122.  Cf. Myers & Samp, supra note 113, at 671-79 (assessing the possibility of attorney liability for 
negligent trust situs). 
123.  Noting that “[o]ther states have enacted similar measures,” the staff of the Arizona Senate 
explained that Arizona’s perpetual trust legislation, ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 14-2901 (Supp. 
2004), was “an effort to retain people who want to set up [perpetual trusts] in state.” STAFF 
OF ARIZ. STATE S., FACT SHEET FOR S.B. 1112, 47th Leg., 1st Session, at 1 (1998), 
http://www.azleg.state.az.us/legtext/43leg/2r/summary/s.1112.ced.htm. 
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Specification 2. 
Trust Assetsjt = αConstant + λYeart + ψStatej + ηYearsAbolishjt + δYearsAbolishedjt2 + Ejt 
 
As discussed earlier, not all states levy an income tax on trust funds 
attracted from out of state. While the tax burden varies within a taxing state 
because of increasing marginal rates, we think a dummy variable specification 
for FIT as YES or NO, as defined earlier, is sufficient. First, controlling for 
increasing marginal rates—particularly where, as here, we do not observe 
individual accounts—is not feasible. Moreover, many states do not levy a FIT 
on trust funds attracted from out of state (these states are coded as NO for FIT 
in Table 5). Once the settlor decides to incur the costs of settling a trust out of 
state, the marginal cost of choosing a state that will not levy a FIT on the 
trust’s income is close to zero. Hence, our binary coding scheme is likely to 
comport with actual practice. 
Fortunately for our estimation strategy, there are RAP states and abolition 
states that do not tax, and a handful of states changed their tax treatment of 
trust funds attracted from out of state during our sample time period. (One 
abolition state changed its tax status: Wisconsin switched to NO for FIT in 
1999. Florida abolished the RAP and its tax at the same time in 2001.) Thus, 
we estimate the following model, interacting tax status with the abolition 
dummy: 
Specification 3. 
Trust Assetsjt = αConstant + λYeart + ψStatej + ωNoFITjt + ηAbolishjt + βNoFIT*Abolishjt + Ejt 
 
In Specification 3, the primary coefficient of interest is β, which measures 
the marginal impact of eliminating both income taxation of trust funds 
attracted from out of state and the RAP. We also report a specification 
interacting the NoFIT variable with the quadratic term. 
The data are state-level panel data. We used state fixed effects to deal with 
state error terms. Random-effects models were also employed and yielded 
surprisingly similar coefficient estimates and standard errors. In practice, fixed 
effects are favored for state panels such as this, so we report those results.124 All 
 
124. In addition, in unreported regressions, we ran feasible generalized-least-squares regressions 
allowing for panel-specific autocorrelation. The results for the interaction effects (which we 
believe to be the correct specification) survived largely intact. We also clustered the standard 
errors by state, which yielded similar results: Some of the dummy-variable specifications 
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reported regressions are ordinary least squares (OLS) and include a constant 
term, state dummies, and year dummies. 
Because APTs were adopted in only a few states, all toward the end of the 
sample timeframe, we have few observations on them. Further, in the period 
under study, Nevada was the only state that both retained the Rule Against 
Perpetuities and adopted APTs, having authorized them in 1999. Therefore, in 
one specification we exclude the three joint abolition/APT states (Delaware, 
Alaska, and Rhode Island) from the estimation entirely to confirm that our 
results are driven by the abolition of the RAP, not by APTs. In these 
specifications, we also exclude Massachusetts because of the merger event 
discussed above. 
C. Econometric Results 
We examine several different measures of a state’s competitiveness in the 
jurisdictional competition for trust funds: total assets (Table 1), log total assets 
(Table 2), average account size (Table 3), and number of accounts (Table 4). 
1. Trust Assets 
The regressions reported in Table 1 use total reported assets as the 
dependent variable. Model 1 estimates Specification 1, which is the effect of 
abolition conditioned only on year and state fixed effects. The coefficient 
estimate on Abolish is 6.63 and is significant at the 5% level, implying that after 
a state abolished the RAP, it attracted $6.63 billion more in reported trust 
assets relative to states that did not abolish the RAP. To put this finding in 
perspective, the average state had $19 billion in reported trust assets in 2003. 
Given that smaller states such as Alaska, South Dakota, Wisconsin, and Idaho 
were among the first to abolish the RAP, this result is even larger than a 
comparison with the overall state average implies. 
Model 2 adds some additional dependent variables, and the coefficient on 
Abolish decreases slightly to 6.02. None of the trust law variables—APTs, 
USRAP, or NoFIT—are significant at the 5% level. While state income is 
significant and signed positively as expected, the effect of state population is 
surprisingly negative and significant, implying that increases in population 
decrease relative trust assets. We suspect, however, that this result is nothing 
 
were no longer statistically significant, but the NoFIT interactions and quadratic 
specifications remained significant. 
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more than an artifact of how strong the competition for trust assets has been 
from the small states. Delaware, South Dakota, and Alaska, which are among 
the most aggressive of the abolishing jurisdictions, have small populations. 
Model 3 includes dummy variables for the year of abolition and for each of 
the prior two years. No strong trends are discernable. In Model 4, which adds 
state-specific trends, the coefficient on Abolish decreases to 3.97, but remains 
statistically significant at the 5% level. Finally, the exclusion of Alaska, 
Delaware, Massachusetts, and Rhode Island in Model 5 makes little difference 
to the coefficient estimate, though now the result is barely significant at the 5% 
level. 
In sum, our simple before-after specification suggests that state trust assets 
significantly increased after the abolition of the RAP, and this result is robust 
to the inclusion of time trends and the exclusion of asset-protection states. 
Taking the estimate of $6 billion as correct, a back-of-the-envelope calculation 
of the total trust assets attracted by abolishing the RAP is striking. Within the 
timeframe of our sample, 17 states abolished the RAP with a resulting average 
increase of $6 billion in trust assets per state. This implies that as of 2003, 
roughly $100 billion in trust funds have poured into the states that abolished 
the Rule ($6 billion per state * 17 states = $102 billion in total assets).  
We must emphasize, however, that this $100 billion figure is a rough 
estimate given the standard errors.125 Further, we cannot discern the extent to 
which the observed increase in trust assets reflects an inflow of newly created 
trusts or the poaching of already existing trusts. Because our sample includes 
only trusts administered by federally reporting institutions, our estimates 
probably understate the total increase in trust assets experienced by the 
abolishing states. Likewise, the quadratic models imply that these are 
underestimates because the effect grows over time (at least for the first ten 
years or so), but the Abolish coefficient is simply the average effect by state, and 
most states did not abolish the RAP until the late 1990s.  
 
125.  The 95% confidence interval implies that between $11 billion and $200 billion poured into 
the abolishing states (i.e., there is a 95% chance that this interval includes the true value). 
We could also calculate this figure using the coefficients given in Model 6. Ten states 
(counting Wisconsin) abolished the Rule and did not tax trust funds attracted from out of 
state. If we ignore the coefficients on Abolish and NoFIT, we have $14 billion per state * 10 
states = $140 billion (and a 95% confidence interval between $50 billion and $220 billion). If 
we subtract the negative NoFIT coefficient (-6.51), we have $7.5 billion per state * 10 states 
= $75 billion. The NoFIT result is significant at the .039 level and disappears in other 
specifications, so it is not clear how to treat it for these purposes. 
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We now turn to the effect of FITs. Model 6 allows an interaction between 
NoFIT and Abolish. Here the coefficient on Abolish is indistinguishable from 
zero, while the coefficient on the interaction term NoFIT*Abolish is 14, roughly 
twice as large as the effect of Abolish before. We interpret these coefficients to 
imply that a state that abolished the Rule but taxed income in trust funds 
attracted from out of state experienced no observable increase in trust business. 
By contrast, a state that abolished the Rule and did not tax income in such 
trusts experienced an average increase in reported trust assets of $14 billion. 
This finding strongly implies that the increases we observe stem from the 
inflow of assets from out of state. (In principle, the NoFIT*Abolish coefficient 
of 14 should be weighed against the seemingly anomalous negative coefficient 
on NoFIT. We discuss this qualification in greater detail below.) 
The quadratic specification in Model 7, which tests jointly significant at the 
0.032 level and so appears to fit the data well, yields interesting results. The 
coefficient on Years Abolished is positive, and the squared term is negative, 
suggesting an effect that increases and then decreases over time. Taking the 
coefficients at face value, a state increases its trust assets each year after the 
abolition of the RAP, with the yearly effect of abolition peaking roughly 10 
years after abolition. This result is consistent with our learning hypothesis and 
with increased competition as more states abolished the RAP in the late 1990s 
and early 2000s.126 When the quadratic is interacted with NoFIT in Model 8, 
the results again indicate that nearly all of the observable effect of abolition 
emanates from abolition states that do not levy an income tax on trust funds 
attracted from out of state. 
As a robustness check, we replicate some of these regressions in Table 2 
using log trust assets as the dependent variable. The effect of using log trust 
assets is twofold. First, it reduces the influence of outlier states with large trust 
assets, such as New York and Delaware. Second, the coefficient on Abolish now 
can be interpreted as the proportion increase in trust assets after abolition (e.g., 
a coefficient of .25 on Abolish would imply that trust funds increased by 25% 
after abolition). 
In the first three models, the results on our variables of interest are 
remarkably similar to Table 1 and imply that trust assets increase by roughly 
20% after a state abolishes the Rule. In the quadratic specification in Model 5, 
the coefficients are not jointly significant, although the terms are signed the 
same as in Table 1 with roughly the same relative magnitude. When the NoFIT 
 
126.  As previously noted, stock market effects and other yearly fluctuations are removed by the 
inclusion of year dummies. 
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interactions are added to the quadratic specification, however, the results are 
strongly significant and comparable to those in Table 1. This finding again 
suggests that abolition only increases the trust assets of those states that also 
did not levy an income tax on trust funds attracted from out of state. 
There are two somewhat anomalous findings we wish to address. First, the 
USRAP results in both Tables 1 and 2 are positive and sometimes statistically 
significant at the 5% level or close to it. Second, in both tables the NoFIT 
dummy is negative and significant when it is interacted with Abolish. 
In our view, the weak USRAP results in Tables 1 and 2 do not provide 
sufficient grounds to conclude that adoption of USRAP had an effect on a 
state’s trust assets. First, the USRAP results in Tables 1 and 2 are not replicated 
in the other regressions. Second, when we take log trust assets as our 
dependent variable in Table 2, the USRAP coefficient is significant only in 
Model 4. 
Third, the coefficients become very small and insignificant in both Tables 1 
and 2 when state-specific trends are entered (this result recurs when we take 
the number of accounts as our dependent variable in Table 4). That the 
USRAP results are positive without state-specific trends but disappear with 
state-specific trends is consistent with the hypothesis that states that adopted 
USRAP had contemporaneously growing trust business. States with growing 
trust business are likely to have an organized trust bar, and prior to the repeal 
movement USRAP was popular with trust lawyers.127 
Fourth, we are not as confident with respect to USRAP as we are with 
respect to abolition that our research design has avoided the potentially biasing 
effects of bank mergers. The USRAP coefficient is never statistically significant 
when we consider average account size in Table 3, which is the dependent 
variable least affected by mergers. Further, when we take trust assets per state 
resident as our dependent variable in Appendix Table 1, the USRAP results are 
at times negative and significant. 
In sum, our USRAP results allow us to conclude only that the data do not 
support the proposition that enactment of USRAP leads to an increase in the 
state’s reported trust assets. 
We turn now to the negative NoFIT results. The coefficient on NoFIT is 
only negative and significant when we interact NoFIT and Abolish. Technically, 
one should add all three coefficients (NoFIT, Abolish, and Abolish*NoFIT) to 
get the full interactive effect of abolishing the RAP and not taxing income in 
 
127.  See DUKEMINIER & JOHANSON, supra note 34, at 836. 
SITKOFF & SCHANZENBACH  FINAL 11/21/2005  6:55:00 PM 
jurisdictional competition for trust funds 
407 
 
trusts attracted from out of state. For example, in Model 6 of Table 1 the 
coefficient on Abolish is small (-0.98) and not significant, so we can ignore it. 
The NoFIT coefficient is -6.51 and significant at the 5% level, implying that the 
full effect of abolishing the RAP and not taxing trust funds attracted from out 
of state is more on the order of $7.5 billion, not $14 billion.128 This result recurs 
in Table 2 but is even more pronounced. However, these negative NoFIT 
coefficients do not alter our central conclusions that (1) abolishing the RAP 
increases the state’s reported trust assets, and (2) all of the observable effect of 
abolition comes from states that also did not levy an income tax on trusts 
attracted from out of state. The key results are that the main effect of Abolish 
disappears and the interacted effect is large and significant. 
The counterintuitive negative NoFIT coefficient probably results from 
specification error. First, the NoFIT coefficient was generally small and not 
statistically significant prior to the interaction. Second, the before-and-after 
comparisons impose some strong conditions on the data. Inasmuch as the 
more flexible quadratic specifications strongly suggest that the effect of 
abolition decayed over time, in our simple interaction we may be forcing the 
negative result into the tax term. Notice that the significant, negative tax result 
goes away in the quadratic interaction in both Tables 1 and 2. Third, the NoFIT 
coefficient is never significant when we take average account size to be the 
dependent variable in Table 3. Finally, only five states changed their tax 
policies. As a result, we do not have much identifying information on NoFIT, 
so it is not surprising that the coefficient on NoFIT is sensitive to model 
specifications.129 
2. Average Account Size  
Average account size is an important dependent variable for a number of 
reasons. First, as noted above, average account size should be less sensitive to 
the potential bias from mergers and branching. Second, the exemption from 
transfer taxes is today $1.5 million and for much of the period under study was 
$1 million. Hence, an increase in average account size above those numbers 
implies an influx of trust assets that are not exempt from transfer taxation. 
Third, locating all of one’s trust assets in a single account with one institutional 
trustee is often recommended because larger accounts pay a smaller percentage 
 
128.  See supra note 125 and accompanying text. 
129.  Because we include state fixed effects in every model, we can identify policy effects only 
from those states that changed policies in the timeframe of the data. 
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in fees relative to smaller accounts, and substantial clients get better service.130 
Thus, there is reason to suspect that banks and trust companies lobbied for the 
abolition of the RAP as a gateway to attract all the trust business of wealthy 
donors. 
The results for average account size, which track the abolition results for 
total trust assets (Table 1), are reported in Table 3.131 In the simple specification 
of Model 1, abolition of the rule raises average account size by $289,000. To 
put this figure in perspective, the average account size in 2003 was about  
$1 million. The effect of abolition decreases to $191,000 when we include more 
control variables in Model 2, probably because APTs are found to have a large 
effect (roughly $507,000) and, of the four APT states, three also abolished the 
RAP. Not surprisingly, the joint significance of the two taken together is very 
strong (roughly the 0.0001 level) in Models 2 and 3. However, the estimated 
effect of APTs is negative (but not significant) when we include state-specific 
trends in Model 4, and when we exclude the primary APT states in Model 5, 
the effect of abolition remains significant but decreases to $150,000. 
Accordingly, the effect of abolition is clear and consistent across models, while 
the effect of validating APTs is inconsistent.132 
The interaction between Abolish and NoFIT in Model 6 suggests, consistent 
with our previous results, that most of the effect on account size comes from 
abolition states that do not levy a tax on income in trusts attracted from out of 
state. The quadratic specification of Model 7 suggests an increasing but 
decaying effect over time but is not jointly significant. However, interaction of 
the quadratic term with NoFIT in Model 8 yields coefficients that are jointly 
significant at less than the .0001 level,133 and these coefficients are consistent 
with our previous findings. Specifically, the interaction results imply an 
increasing-then-decreasing growth in average account size in those states that 
abolished the RAP and did not levy an income tax on trust funds attracted 
from out of state. 
 
130.  See supra notes 115-116 and accompanying text. 
131.  Because we are using average account size, we use state income per capita as the dependent 
variable instead of gross income and population. 
132.  The results for total assets suggest the same conclusion. In Table 1 the APT coefficient, 
which was positive (but not significant) in Model 2, became negative and significant when 
we added state-specific trends in Model 4. 
133.  Indeed, although not reported in the table, the quadratic interaction terms are jointly 
statistically significant at the 0.0001 level independent of the main effects. 
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In sum, average account size increases by nearly $200,000 after the RAP is 
abolished, and this effect comes almost entirely from states that did not tax 
income in trusts attracted from out of state. As before, the quadratic 
specification suggests that abolishing the Rule initially increases trust assets, 
but the impact of abolition wanes over time. Thus, our results for aggregate 
trust assets are largely replicated for average account size. 
3. Total Number of Accounts  
Table 4 reports the results of regressions that use total reported state 
accounts as the dependent variable. In these regressions the dummy variable 
specifications yield insignificant results and small coefficient estimates. 
However, the quadratic term in Model 5 is jointly significant and signed as 
before. Hence, even though neither the linear nor the squared term is 
independently significant, their joint significance of 0.0423 implies that there 
was an increase in the number of accounts after a state abolished the RAP. 
Taking the coefficients at face value, the first year a state abolished the RAP it 
drew nearly 700 additional accounts relative to nonabolition states. Five years 
after a state abolished the RAP, it drew nearly 2,000 additional accounts. 
The tax interactions are mixed. In Model 4, the interaction term is positive 
but not statistically significant at the 5% level. The quadratic interaction in 
Model 6 is difficult to interpret as well. Taking the coefficients at face value, 
accounts decrease and then increase in states that abolish the RAP, but this 
effect is reversed in states that abolish the RAP and do not tax. The results are 
strongly jointly significant (p-value is 0.0001), however, and the coefficients 
suggest that accounts grew at an increasing rate after abolition. It is also clear 
that the largest effect again emanates from states that both abolished the RAP 
and did not levy an income tax on trust funds attracted from out of state. The 
dummy variable specification (which represents the average effect over time) 
suggests a small effect. This implies that even if the strongly significant 
quadratic specification is valid, the net effect has been quite small. 
The small effect of abolition on total accounts fits neatly with our trust-
asset and average-account findings: If trust assets increased by proportionately 
more than trust accounts in abolition states, then abolition must be attracting 
relatively larger accounts. Our findings for average account size indicate this to 
be the case.134 
 
134.  These results also imply that mergers are not confounding our results. If increases in 
reported assets in abolition states were driven by the acquisition of banks in nonabolition 
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D. Summary of Results 
In this Section, we offer a nontechnical summary of our principal findings. 
1. Perpetuities and Fiduciary Income Taxes 
We find that, on average, after a state abolished the Rule Against 
Perpetuities its reported trust assets through 2003 increased by as much as 20% 
relative to states that retained the Rule. This finding is replicated for average 
account size, which likewise increased by as much as 20% relative to states that 
retained the Rule. In dollars, after a state abolished the Rule, its reported trust 
assets increased through 2003 by roughly $6 billion relative to those that 
retained the Rule. Average account size increased by roughly $200,000. These 
results are replicated in regressions that exclude Delaware and Alaska, which 
tells us that the phenomenon is not limited to those two states. 
Regarding fiduciary income taxes, we found that, by itself, whether a state 
levied an income tax on trust funds attracted from out of state had no 
observable effect on the state’s reported trust assets. This finding is consistent 
with the incentives created by the federal income tax. For many trusts the 
process of avoiding the federal income tax likewise avoids state income taxes.135 
Perpetual trusts, however, have a different duration and purpose from 
ordinary trusts that might warrant accumulating trust income. Although doing 
so unavoidably triggers federal income tax liability, state income tax liability 
can be avoided by locating the trust in a state that does not levy a FIT on trust 
funds attracted from out of state. Hence we tested the interactive effect of a 
state’s income tax and perpetuities laws. These tests indicate that only those 
states that did not tax income in trusts attracted from out of state experienced 
an inflow of trust assets after abolishing the Rule. States that abolished the 
Rule but taxed such trusts experienced no observable increase in reported trust 
assets. These findings are consistent with our theoretical intuitions. Once a 
settlor has committed to incurring the costs of establishing an out-of-state 
perpetual trust, the marginal cost of choosing a state that does not tax trusts 
attracted from out of state is close to zero, but the benefits are potentially great. 
We conclude that the effect of abolishing the Rule is substantial. Our 
findings imply that, through 2003, roughly $100 billion in trust funds have 
 
states, we would expect to observe a proportionate increase in the number of reported 
accounts. 
135.  See supra Subsection I.D.2. 
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poured into the states that have validated perpetual trusts.136 Assuming the 
applicability of typical industry commission schedules, these funds are worth 
perhaps as much as $1 billion in yearly trustees’ commissions.137 
We hasten to add three caveats. First, we cannot estimate the tax revenue 
lost owing to the use of perpetual transfer-tax-exempt trusts. Such an estimate 
would require complex actuarial discounting based on individual account data, 
but we have only state-level data. The most we can say is that not all the trust 
dollars that have poured into the abolishing states are transfer-tax exempt. 
After abolishing the Rule, average account size in Illinois and Delaware both 
increased and exceeded the transfer-tax exemption.138 
Second, we cannot discern the extent to which any given state’s increase in 
reported trust assets stemmed from an inflow of newly created trusts versus the 
poaching of already existing trusts.139 Likewise, to the extent that our findings 
represent the movement of already existing trusts, we cannot identify from 
which states those trusts moved. 
Third, because our sample data are limited to federally reporting trustees 
(and so do not include the entire trust fund population), our estimates likely 
understate the amount of trust assets that has moved as a result of the abolition 
of the Rule. 
2. Self-Settled Asset Protection Trusts 
There is some tentative evidence that validating APTs increases a state’s 
trust business. We did not find this effect consistently, however, and our 
findings are highly sensitive to choice of control variables. In technical terms, 
the relevant coefficient was not consistently signed and in most specifications 
 
136.  See supra note 125 and accompanying text. 
137.  For typical commission schedules, see supra note 115. The $1 billion figure is a very rough 
estimate that assumes a typical account size between $1 million and $2 million. Because the 
data imply that a fair number of much larger trusts moved into the abolition states, see supra 
Section III.A, and larger trusts pay a smaller percentage in fees, there is good reason to 
suppose that this estimate overstates the true figure. However, because our sample of 
federally reporting institutional trustees does not include the entire population of trust 
funds, our estimates probably understate the total increase in trust assets experienced by the 
abolishing states. 
138.  See supra Section III.A. 
139.  Because already existing trusts in jurisdictions that retained the Rule would have been 
drafted to comply with the Rule, see Sterk, supra note 33, at 2117 n.81, we conjecture that our 
results arise primarily from new trusts. 
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was not statistically significant. Accordingly, we can neither confirm nor deny 
the existence of a significant APT business. The most we can say is that, 
through 2003, the effect on a state’s trust business of validating APTs is not on 
the same order of magnitude as the effect of abolishing the Rule Against 
Perpetuities. We intend to revisit this question when more data are available. 
After the period of our study, three more states and possibly a fourth have 
validated APTs.140 
3. Uniform Statutory Rule Against Perpetuities 
We find no consistent evidence that adopting USRAP increases a state’s 
trust business. Given the prior emergence of perpetuities saving clauses and the 
contemporaneous availability of tax-advantaged perpetual trusts in South 
Dakota and elsewhere, this result is unsurprising. Whatever the advantages of 
an out-of-state ninety-year trust, an out-of-state perpetual trust offers more. 
iv. implications for policy debates 
A. The Fall of the Rule Against Perpetuities 
The jurisdictional competition for trust funds is both real and intense. 
Since 1986 a host of states have altered their perpetuities laws to give their local 
banks and lawyers a competitive advantage in what our results show is a 
national market for trust fund services. Our estimates imply that, through 
2003, the movement to abolish the Rule Against Perpetuities has affected the 
situs of $100 billion in reported trust assets—roughly 10% of the 2003 total.141 
Not surprisingly, the trend toward abolition has accelerated in recent years. 
There is, of course, a growing literature that examines the pros and cons of 
the fall of the Rule,142 an issue that is beyond the scope of this Article. It is enough 
here to make three observations. First, the existing literature lacks a solid 
empirical foundation, a problem that plagues not just domestic scholars but 
students of the Rule throughout the common law world. Recall that in its recent 
report on perpetuities reform, the English Law Commission lamented the lack of 
 
140.  See supra note 81 and accompanying text. 
141.  See supra note 125 and accompanying text. 
142.  See supra note 33. 
SITKOFF & SCHANZENBACH  FINAL 11/21/2005  6:55:00 PM 
jurisdictional competition for trust funds 
413 
 
empirical evidence (and the impossibility of obtaining any) on the Rule’s effect.143 
Accordingly, we hope that our findings will illuminate the policy debate, both 
domestically and abroad, by supplying an empirical analysis of the domestic 
movement to abolish the Rule.144 To that end, we discuss below a recent 
proposal by the staff of the Joint Committee on Taxation to close the 
perpetuities loophole in the GST tax.145 As we shall see, the staff based its 
analysis in part on an assumption that our findings show to be erroneous. 
Second, much of the existing literature focuses on the evils of perpetual dead 
hand control without discounting those evils in view of their likelihood. If a 
perpetual trust is drafted so that each generation is given a special power to 
appoint the remainder to the next generation outright or in further trust, as in 
Case 3 above,146 dead hand concerns are resolved. Such a power permits each 
generation to decide whether to continue the trust (and its tax exemption) or to 
bring the trust to an end. We are told that such provisions are boilerplate in 
transfer-tax-exempt perpetual trust forms.147 Even if these clauses become 
 
143.  See supra text accompanying note 11. The Law Commission did, however, conduct a survey 
of Scottish conveyancing lawyers to learn about the effects, if any, of there being no Rule 
Against Perpetuities in Scotland. See ENGLISH LAW COMM’N, supra note 11, at 21-22. Another 
example of perpetuities reform abroad comes from Canada, where the province of Manitoba 
abolished its Rule over twenty years ago. Act of Aug. 18, 1983, 1982-83-84 S.M. ch. 43, § 3; 
see also DUKEMINIER ET AL., supra note 5, at 721, 723 (discussing perpetuities reform in 
Manitoba and England). 
144.  For example, to the extent that our findings imply that abolishing the Rule prior to the 
enactment of the GST tax had little effect on a state’s trust business, they tend to support 
the proposals of Dukeminier and Krier, supra note 9, against the criticisms of Tate, supra 
note 33. On the other hand, the lack of perpetual trusts before the GST tax could stem from a 
lack of awareness of the possibility. Now that the GST tax has given perpetual trusts salience, 
prospective donors might remain interested in perpetual trusts even if Congress closes the 
perpetuities loophole in the GST tax. We discuss these issues further in Schanzenbach & Sitkoff, 
supra note 13.  
145.  See STAFF OF J. COMM. ON TAXATION, supra note 14, at 392-95. 
146.  See supra text accompanying note 47. Another possibility is the appointment of a trust 
protector who is given the power to modify or terminate the trust and to name his or her 
successor. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TRUSTS § 64(2) (2003); DUKEMINIER ET AL., supra 
note 5, at 579-80. Modern texts urge the use of clauses that preserve flexibility, including the 
power to modify or terminate the trust. See, e.g., DUKEMINIER ET AL., supra note 5, at 576; 
PENNELL, supra note 15, ch. 4, at 2-6. 
147.  See, e.g., NENNO, supra note 50, at 164 (supplying a model clause); see also Pierce H. 
McDowell, III, The Dynasty Trust: Protective Armor for Generations To Come, TR. & EST., Oct. 
1993, at 47, 53 (noting that it “is often desirable to give at least some of the beneficiaries 
special testamentary powers of appointment that will enable them to change the dispositive 
terms of the trust” in light of unanticipated changes in circumstances). 
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ubiquitous in the formbooks, however, they are not required, and trust lawyers 
have told us anecdotes about settlors who do not include these clauses because 
they seek precisely the perpetual control that the Rule was designed to prohibit. 
Third, settlors who reside in a state that has retained the Rule can easily 
avoid the Rule by paying the small transaction cost required to create a trust in, 
and to move assets to, a state that has abolished the Rule. Hence, the federal 
transfer taxes have mortally wounded the once-formidable Rule by reducing it 
to a mere transaction cost. Of course, this is not the first time that federal tax 
law has warped state property law.148 But even if Congress were to close the 
perpetuities loophole in the GST tax, it is difficult to imagine the rise of an 
interest group that would lobby for reenactment of the Rule Against 
Perpetuities.149 Accordingly, to the extent that the policies that underpin the 
Rule continue to have contemporary relevance, it is necessary to look elsewhere 
to service those policies.150 
B. The Rise of the Self-Settled Asset Protection Trust? 
The jurisdictional competition in trust law appears ready to focus next on 
APTs. Indeed, in the last two years three more states and possibly a fourth have 
validated them.151 Because APTs could be used in effect to opt out of medical 
malpractice and almost any other form of liability, their validation has sparked 
a lively policy debate.152 This debate involves not only trust law but also 
 
148.  See Ira Mark Bloom, How Federal Transfer Taxes Affect the Development of Property Law, 48 
CLEV. ST. L. REV. 661 (2000); Robert T. Danforth, The Role of Federalism in Administering a 
National System of Taxation, 57 TAX LAW. 625 (2004); see also DUKEMINIER ET AL., supra note 
5, at 428-29 (discussing the movement to adopt community property, which was stimulated 
in part by a quirk in the federal income tax). 
149.  This statement glosses over the variety of means by which the states have authorized 
perpetual trusts. See supra note 68 and accompanying text. 
150.  See Schanzenbach & Sitkoff, supra note 13. 
151.  See supra note 81 and accompanying text. 
152.  There is a burgeoning academic literature on this question. See supra note 88. There is also a 
vast practitioner literature. See, e.g., NENNO, supra note 50, §§ 69-115; Barry S. Engel & David 
L. Lockwood, Domestic Asset Protection Trusts Contrasted with Foreign Trusts, EST. PLAN., June 
2002, at 288 (2002); David G. Shaftel, Domestic Asset Protection Trusts: Key Issues and Answers, 30 
AM. C. TR. & EST. COUNS. J. 10 (2004). This literature also includes practice manuals. See, e.g., 
AM. B. ASS’N, ASSET PROTECTION STRATEGIES: PLANNING WITH DOMESTIC AND OFFSHORE 
ENTITIES (Alexander A. Bove, Jr., ed. 2002); DUNCAN E. OSBORNE & ELIZABETH MORGAN 
SCHURIG, ASSET PROTECTION: DOMESTIC AND INTERNATIONAL LAW AND TACTICS (2005). On 
creditors’ rights in trust law generally, see Anne S. Emanuel, Spendthrift Trusts: It’s Time To 
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touches on tort and bankruptcy reform. For example, the federal bankruptcy 
reforms adopted in April of 2005153 have been criticized by some for not also 
addressing APTs.154 Both before and after the 2005 legislation, a beneficial 
interest in trust that is not alienable under applicable nonbankruptcy law—
which probably includes the settlor’s interest in a domestic APT—does not 
become part of the bankruptcy estate.155 
Unfortunately, our data do not yet allow us to confirm or deny the 
existence of a significant domestic APT business, though we can say that, 
through 2003, the effect of validating APTs pales in comparison to the effect of 
validating perpetual trusts. As a theoretical matter, if domestic APTs become 
more popular, there is reason to suppose that a race to validate APTs will 
ensue. As we have seen in the case of the RAP, local banks and lawyers are 
adept at obtaining legislation to make them more competitive in the national 
market for trust business. Indeed, the current map of APT jurisdictions 
resembles the perpetual trust map circa 1995, just after Delaware and just 
before a host of other states abolished the Rule. On the other hand, the 
existence of numerous offshore APT jurisdictions renders the analogy between 
APTs and the fall of the RAP imperfect.156 We intend to revisit this issue when 
we have more data. 
 
Codify the Compromise, 72 NEB. L. REV. 179 (1993); Adam J. Hirsch, Spendthrift Trusts and Public 
Policy: Economic and Cognitive Perspectives, 73 WASH. U. L.Q. 1 (1995); and Alan Newman, The 
Rights of Creditors of Beneficiaries Under the Uniform Trust Code: An Examination of the 
Compromise, 69 TENN. L. REV. 771 (2002). 
153.  Bankruptcy Abuse Prevention and Consumer Protection Act of 2005, Pub. L. 109-8, 119 Stat. 
23 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 11 U.S.C.). 
154.  See Albert B. Crenshaw, Keeping Some Hiding Places, WASH. POST, Mar. 20, 2005, at F1; 
Editorial, Bankrupt Bankruptcy Bill, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 3, 2005, at A30; Gretchen Morgenson, 
Proposed Law on Bankruptcy Has Loophole, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 2, 2005, at C1; see also David G. 
Shaftel & David H. Bundy, Impact of New Bankruptcy Provision on Domestic Asset Protection 
Trusts, EST. PLAN., July 2005, at 28 (discussing criticism of the Act and the Act’s relevance 
for domestic APTs). 
155.  11 U.S.C. § 541(c)(2) (2000); see Shaftel & Bundy, supra note 154, at 30-31; John E. Sullivan 
III, New Rules, Old Game, TR. & EST., June 2005, at 59, 61. Senator Charles Schumer 
proposed an amendment to the 2005 Act that would have included in the bankruptcy estate 
any transfer to a self-settled trust in excess of $125,000, but the amendment was rejected by 
the Senate fifty-six to thirty-nine. See 151 CONG. REC. S1980-94 (Mar. 3, 2005). 
156.  Perhaps another difference is that APTs are more likely to face judicial challenge. See supra 
note 88 and accompanying text. 
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C. An Interest Group Theory of Jurisdictional Competition 
Jurisdictional competition, sometimes also called regulatory competition, 
refers to the phenomenon of laws favorable to an industry being enacted to 
attract business to a jurisdiction. The idea, identified first by Charles Tiebout, 
is that people and firms “vote with their feet,” moving from one jurisdiction to 
another based on changes in the local regulatory climate.157 Regulatory 
competition has been studied perhaps most notably in corporate law,158 but the 
phenomenon manifests itself in numerous other fields, including securities, 
bankruptcy, environmental, secured transactions, welfare, and antitrust law, to 
name just a few.159 
We have demonstrated that jurisdictional competition has influenced the 
situs of trust funds totaling roughly $100 billion. More importantly, we can 
trace our results entirely to those states that did not levy an income tax on trust 
funds attracted from out of state. These findings have two important 
implications for the study of jurisdictional competition generally. 
First, our findings lend support to interest group theories of jurisdictional 
competition.160 Much of the literature on jurisdictional competition models 
states as if they were well functioning, profit-maximizing firms. Hence it is 
commonly assumed that states seek to maximize tax and related revenues, 
which supplies the incentive to compete for business against other states.161 But 
 
157.  Charles M. Tiebout, A Pure Theory of Local Expenditures, 64 J. POL. ECON. 416 (1956). 
158.  The classics are Ralph K. Winter, Jr., State Law, Shareholder Protection, and the Theory of the 
Corporation, 6 J. LEGAL STUD. 251 (1977), and William L. Cary, Federalism and Corporate Law: 
Reflections upon Delaware, 83 YALE L.J. 663 (1974). See generally Sitkoff, supra note 18, at 
1140-43 (summarizing the debate over regulatory competition in corporate law). 
159.  See, e.g., Marcus Cole, “Delaware Is Not a State”: Are We Witnessing Jurisdictional Competition 
in Bankruptcy?, 55 VAND. L. REV. 1845 (2002); Kahan & Kamar, supra note 17, at 682-84 
(collecting examples); Richard L. Revesz, Rehabilitating Interstate Competition: Rethinking the 
“Race-to-the-Bottom” Rationale for Federal Environmental Regulation, 67 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1210 
(1992); see also Abraham Bell & Gideon Parchomovsky, Of Property and Federalism, 115 YALE 
L.J. 72 (2005) (proposing a mechanism for expanding competition in state property law). 
160.  See, e.g., Carney, supra note 18; William J. Carney, The Production of Corporate Law, 71 S. 
CAL. L. REV. 715 (1998); John C. Coffee, Jr., The Future of Corporate Federalism: State 
Competition and the New Trend Toward De Facto Federal Minimum Standards, 8 CARDOZO L. 
REV. 759, 761-62 (1987); Macey & Miller, supra note 18; Richard L. Revesz, Federalism and 
Environmental Regulation: A Public Choice Analysis, 115 HARV. L. REV. 553 (2001). 
161.  See supra note 12; cf. Lucian Arye Bebchuk, Federalism and the Corporation: The Desirable 
Limits on State Competition in Corporate Law, 105 HARV. L. REV. 1437, 1454 (1992) 
(contending that “the appropriate assumption is that a state’s interest in attracting 
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as one of us has argued elsewhere, “this account represents an 
oversimplification of the political process. Individual legislators cannot fully 
internalize the benefits of increased tax revenues, which are in effect a public 
good.”162 We have shown that in the competition for trust business, states 
respond to competitive pressures, but it is impossible to link their incentive for 
doing so to immediate tax or other direct revenue increases. To repeat, only 
those states that did not levy an income tax on trust funds attracted from out of 
state experienced an increase in trust business from abolishing the Rule 
Against Perpetuities. 
True, in states that did not tax such trusts revenue may have increased 
indirectly owing to taxes paid by financial institutions, their employees, and 
local lawyers. Assuming typical industry commission schedules, the  
$100 billion in trust funds that have moved carry with them perhaps as much 
as $1 billion in yearly trustees’ commissions.163 Attracting trust business “is 
good for a state’s economy.”164 But this is our point. The story of jurisdictional 
competition in trust law is a story of successful lobbying by local banks and 
trust lawyers, the principal beneficiaries of attracting new trust business to the 
state.165 On this account, whether jurisdictional competition leads to a race to 
the top, a race to the bottom, or somewhere in between depends on whether 
the relevant interest group dynamic will prompt private-interest or public-
regarding legislation. 
 
incorporations shapes the behavior of the individuals actually involved in the state’s 
lawmaking process”). 
162.  Sitkoff, supra note 18, at 1143-44; see also Levinson, supra note 12, at 946 (noting that “elected 
representatives do not derive any direct benefits from the popularity or prosperity of their 
jurisdictions or from the increasing tax revenues accompanying population or commercial 
growth”). 
163.  See supra note 137. 
164.  Sterk, supra note 33, at 2103. 
165.  We thus extend the lawyer-focused analysis of Macey and Miller to include transactional 
lawyers in addition to litigators. See Macey & Miller, supra note 18. In separate work, one of 
us finds a similar phenomenon in the jurisdictional competition for statutory business 
trusts, which unlike corporations (but like private trusts) do not pay franchise taxes. See 
Robert H. Sitkoff, Trust as “Uncorporation”: A Research Agenda, 2005 U. ILL. L. REV. 31, 40-
41; Robert H. Sitkoff, The Rise of the Statutory Business Trust (unpublished manuscript, 
on file with authors). In a related vein, Larry Ribstein has argued that lawyer licensing 
“encourages lawyers to participate in lawmaking by capitalizing the benefits of their law-
improvement efforts in the value of the law license.” Larry E. Ribstein, Lawyers as 
Lawmakers: A Theory of Lawyer Licensing, 69 MO. L. REV. 299, 299 (2004). 
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The genesis of the Alaska legislation in a fishing trip taken by two lawyers 
and a banker is a telling anecdote.166 Alaska’s lawmakers did not seek to attract 
trust business of their own accord or to maximize tax revenues (Alaska has 
neither a fiduciary nor a personal income tax). Rather, a group of people who 
stood to benefit from a change in Alaska law persuaded Alaska lawmakers to do 
so. As Sterk has observed, “[j]urisdictions seeking to become trust havens . . . 
appear content to draw business to local financial institutions and lawyers, 
even without direct benefit to the public fisc.”167 
Second, our results suggest that prior work that is based on the tax-revenue 
model, in which states are assumed to behave like profit-maximizing firms, 
should be reconsidered. For example, drawing on the theory of industrial 
organization, Bebchuk and Hamdani have argued that there is little 
jurisdictional competition in corporate law because “a challenge to Delaware’s 
dominance by some other small state is unlikely to be profitable.”168 In our 
view, this conclusion is based on a flawed premise. Even if attracting business 
does not directly increase a state’s tax revenue, local interest groups may 
nonetheless benefit from, and hence lobby for, laws that will attract new 
business.169 As we have seen, despite the lack of an immediate increase in state 
tax revenue, jurisdictional competition is manifestly a force in the context of 
trust law. There is an ongoing race to abolish the Rule Against Perpetuities, 
and so far the prize is on the order of $100 billion in trust business. 
D. Federal Wealth Transfer Taxes 
Congress is currently considering the extent to which the federal 
government should tax inter vivos and testamentary wealth transfers.170 
 
166.  See supra text accompanying note 76. 
167.  Sterk, supra note 74, at 1060. 
168.  See Bebchuk & Hamdani, supra note 17, at 557. 
169.  In a recent work, Roberta Romano advances a similar analysis. See Roberta Romano, Is 
Regulatory Competition a Problem or Irrelevant for Corporate Governance?, 21 OXFORD REV. 
ECON. POL’Y 212 (2005); see also Kahan & Kamar, supra note 17, at 694-99 (examining the 
incentives of local lawyers); id. at 728-730 (criticizing the model of states as profit seekers). 
170.  For example, on April 13, 2005, the House of Representatives voted to make permanent the 
repeal of the estate and GST taxes that currently will take effect in 2010 for one year. CONG. 
REC. H1942 (daily ed. Apr. 13, 2005) (Roll No. 102) (reporting the passage of the Death Tax 
Repeal Permanency Act, H.R. 8, 109th Cong. (2005)). 
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Naturally, there is a thick academic literature on this question.171 Without 
getting embroiled in that debate, we make two modest observations.  
First, our results are consistent with other studies showing that people 
undertake significant measures to avoid these taxes. Second, to close the old 
loophole for successive life estates, the duration of the transfer-tax exemption 
must be decoupled from state perpetuities law, a step that Congress is 
beginning to consider. On January 27, 2005, the Staff of the Joint Committee 
on Taxation (JCT) issued a report in which it proposed closing the perpetuities 
loophole in the GST tax by prohibiting the allocation of the transfer-tax 
exemption to a trust for the benefit of a generation more remote than the 
transferor’s grandchildren.172 The report gives two reasons for closing the 
loophole: (1) “[p]erpetual dynasty trusts are inconsistent with the” structure of 
the GST tax, and (2) “perpetual dynasty trusts deny equal treatment of all 
taxpayers because such trusts can only be established in the States that have 
repealed the mandatory rule against perpetuities.”173 
 
171.  See, e.g., Mark L. Ascher, Curtailing Inherited Wealth, 89 MICH. L. REV. 69 (1990); Karen C. 
Burke & Grayson M.P. McCouch, A Consumption Tax on Gifts and Bequests?, 17 VA. TAX REV. 657 
(1998); Joseph M. Dodge, Comparing a Reformed Estate Tax with an Accessions Tax and an 
Income-Inclusion System, and Abandoning the Generation-Skipping Tax, 56 S.M.U. L. REV. 551 
(2003); Michael J. Graetz, To Praise the Estate Tax, Not To Bury It, 93 YALE L.J. 259 (1983); 
Wojciech Kopczuk & Joel Slemrod, Tax Consequences on Wealth Accumulation and Transfers of the 
Rich, in DEATH AND DOLLARS: THE ROLE OF GIFTS AND BEQUESTS IN AMERICA 213 (Alicia H. 
Munnell & Annika Sundén eds., 2003); Edward J. McCaffery, The Uneasy Case for Wealth 
Transfer Taxation, 104 YALE L.J. 283 (1994); James R. Repetti, Democracy, Taxes, and Wealth, 76 
N.Y.U. L. REV. 825 (2001); Colloquium, Wealth Transfer Taxation, 51 TAX L. REV. 357 (1996) 
(discussing McCaffery’s proposal to abolish the federal estate and gift tax); see also RETHINKING 
ESTATE AND GIFT TAXATION (William G. Gale et al. eds., 2001) (collecting eleven essays on the 
debate over estate taxation). 
172.  See STAFF OF J. COMM. ON TAXATION, supra note 14, at 392-95. Our summary glosses over 
some of the proposal’s finer details. For other proposals, see John G. Shively, Note, The Death 
of the Life in Being—The Required Federal Response to State Abolition of the Rule Against Perpetuities, 
78 WASH. U. L.Q. 371, 392-95 (2000); and Report on Reform, supra note 51, at 268-74. 
173.  STAFF OF J. COMM. ON TAXATION, supra note 14, at 393. The report also projects that  
$300 million in tax revenue would be gained from 2005 through 2014 from closing the 
perpetuities loophole in the GST tax. Id. at 428. We are skeptical of the report’s revenue 
projection. As detailed above, our data do not allow us to estimate the tax revenue that 
would be gained from closing the perpetuities loophole in the GST tax, and there is no 
indication that the committee staff has better data. According to a later report, the 
committee’s estate and gift tax revenue projections are based on a sample of estate tax 
returns drawn from those filed in 2001. STAFF OF J. COMM. ON TAXATION, 109TH CONG., 
OVERVIEW OF REVENUE ESTIMATING PROCEDURES AND METHODOLOGIES USED BY THE STAFF 
OF THE JOINT COMMITTEE ON TAXATION 32 (Comm. Print 2005), available at 
http://www.house.gov/jct/x-1-05.pdf. We are skeptical, however, that one can make a 
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Our findings cast doubt on the importance of the JCT report’s second 
rationale. We do not deny that there may be additional transaction costs to 
establishing a trust out of state. But our results show that settlors in states that 
have retained the Rule have not found these transaction costs to be prohibitive. 
On the other hand, our findings strongly support the JCT report’s first 
rationale, namely, that the federal wealth transfer taxes can easily be avoided in 
a manner that Congress did not intend. 
conclusion 
This Article presents the results of the first empirical study of the domestic 
jurisdictional competition for trust funds. In order to take advantage of a 
loophole in the federal estate tax, a host of states have abolished the Rule 
Against Perpetuities. In order to allow settlors to shield their assets from 
creditors, a handful of states have validated self-settled asset protection trusts. 
Both abolishing the Rule and validating asset protection trusts represent 
significant departures from the common law of trusts. 
Using standard differences-in-differences regression analysis of state-level 
panel data assembled from annual reports to federal banking authorities by 
institutional trustees, we estimate that, on average, through 2003 a state’s 
abolition of the Rule increased its trust assets by $6 billion (a 20% increase on 
average) and increased its average trust account size by $200,000. These 
estimates imply that roughly $100 billion in trust funds have moved to take 
advantage of the abolition of the Rule. By contrast, our examination of 
validating self-settled asset protection trusts yielded indeterminate results. We 
intend to reexamine the effect of validating asset protection trusts when more 
data become available. 
Significantly, states that levied an income tax on trust funds attracted from 
out of state experienced no observable increase in trust business from 
abolishing the Rule Against Perpetuities. Because this finding implies that 
abolishing the Rule does not directly increase a state’s tax revenue, it bears on 
the current scholarly debate over the nature of jurisdictional competition. In 
spite of the lack of direct tax revenue from attracting trust business, the 
jurisdictional competition for trust funds is patently real and intense. 
 
reliable estimate of the number and volume of transfer-tax-exempt perpetual trusts, and 
then incorporate actuarial information about the trusts’ beneficiaries, from a sampling of 
estate tax returns. Neither JCT report provides further specifics on the committee’s 
estimation methodology. 
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Accordingly, we believe that jurisdictional competition in trust law is best 
understood in light of interest group analysis. The immediate benefits of 
attracting new trust business flow to local lawyers and institutional trustees. 
In addition to their theoretical implications, our findings also speak to live 
policy issues concerning state property law and federal tax law. Even if some 
states retain the Rule Against Perpetuities, the Rule will apply, in effect, only to 
real property within those states. When it matters, people move their financial 
assets to escape the Rule’s reach. The federal wealth transfer taxes have thus 
mortally wounded the once-mighty Rule by reducing it to a mere transaction 
cost. As a result, Congress has inadvertently transformed the question of trust 
duration into an issue of federal tax law. If Congress wants to close the 
successive-life-estates loophole in the transfer taxes, it must decouple the 
duration of the transfer-tax exemption from state perpetuities law. 
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Table 1. 
reported state trust assets (in billions) 
model 
variable 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 
Abolish RAP 6.63* (2.93) 
6.02* 
(2.75) 
5.82* 
(2.77) 
3.97* 
(1.70) 
6.08* 
(3.13) 
-.98  
(1.79)   
Abolish*NoFIT      14.0** (4.51)   
Year Abolish   .001  (3.52)      
Year Before 
Abolition   
-1.98  
(2.10)      
Two Years 
Before Abolition   
-1.63 
(1.40)      
Years Abolished       2.18*  (.86) 
.35   
(.49) 
Years Abolished 
Squared       
-.13** 
(.05) 
-.07   
(.04) 
Years Abolished 
*NoFIT        
4.97** 
(1.53) 
Years Abolished 
Squared*NoFIT        
-.18* 
(.08) 
APTs  3.30 (2.43) 
3.42  
(2.47) 
-6.85*  
(2.63)  
-1.49  
(3.53) 
1.89 
(2.74) 
-2.17 
(2.13) 
USRAP  2.62
+ 
(1.53) 
2.60+  
(1.53) 
1.77 
(1.53) 
3.81* 
(1.66) 
3.35*  
(1.55) 
2.67+  
(1.54) 
3.00+ 
(1.61) 
NoFIT  -1.53 (1.95) 
-1.52  
(1.96) 
-1.56  
(1.45) 
-1.74 
(1.91) 
-6.51* 
(3.03) 
-.026   
(1.80) 
-2.17  
(2.13) 
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model 
variable 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 
Population 
(Millions)  
-10.8** 
(2.31) 
-10.7** 
(2.32) 
3.59  
(4.41) 
-11.0** 
(2.31) 
-9.61**  
(2.31) 
-10.4** 
(2.31) 
-9.56** 
(2.32) 
Gross State 
Income 
(Billions) 
 .20**  (.03) 
.20**  
(.03) 
.20**  
(.07) 
.20**  
(.06) 
.19**  
(.03) 
.20**  
(.07) 
.18**  
(.08) 
Test Abolish, 
APT, 
Abolish*NoFIT 
 .0030 .0041 .0103  .0004   
Test Yr, Yr2, 
*NoFIT       .032 .001 
Adj. R-Square .7736 .8044 .8045 .9267 .8046 .8071 .8066 .8047 
State-Specific 
Time Trends No No No Yes No No No No 
Excluding AK, 
DE, RI, MA No No No No Yes No No No 
  
N=940 for columns 1-4 and 6-8; N=874 for column 5. **sig. at <.01 level; *sig. at <.05 level; 
+sig. at <.10 level. Huber-White robust standard errors reported in parentheses. All regressions 
include state and year dummies and a constant. Data covers 1985-2003. 
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Table 2. 
log reported state trust assets 
model 
variable 
1 2 3 4 5 6 
Abolish RAP .23* (.10) 
.20* 
(.10) 
.17* 
(.08) 
-.07 
(.14)   
Abolish*NoFIT    .52**  (.17)   
Years Abolished      .025 (.049) 
.002 
(.04) 
Years Abolished 
Squared     
-.003 
(.003) 
-.01** 
(.003) 
Years Abolished 
*NoFIT      
.16** 
(.053) 
Years Abolished 
Squared*NoFIT      
.009** 
(.003) 
APTs  .28 (.22) 
-.04 
(.22) 
.09 
(.22) 
.33 
(.24) 
-.15 
(.19) 
USRAP  .092   (.056) 
.035 
(.05) 
.11*  
(.056) 
.06 
(.05) 
.06 
(.053) 
NoFIT  -.29+  (.15) -.17 (.16) 
-.41**  
(.16) 
-.16 
(.14) .056  (.09) 
Population 
(Millions)  
-.19**  
(.05) 
.15 
(.10) 
-.15**   
(.05) 
-.19** 
(.06) 
-.14** 
(.045) 
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model 
variable 
1 2 3 4 5 6 
Gross State 
Income 
(Billions) 
 .003** (.001) 
-.0001 
(.001) 
.002** 
(.0005) 
.002** 
(.001) 
.003** 
(.0004) 
Test Abolish, 
APT, 
Abolish*NoFIT 
 .0248 .1152 .0002   
Test Yr, Yr2, 
*NoFIT     .1332 <.0001 
Adj. R-Square .9104 .9127 .9619 .9138 .9199 .9199 
State-Specific 
Time Trends No No Yes No No No 
 
N=940. **sig. at <.01 level; *sig. at <.05 level; +sig. at <.10 level. Huber-White robust standard 
errors reported in parentheses. All regressions include state and year dummies and a constant. 
Data covers 1985-2003. 
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Table 3. 
state average account size (in thousands) 
model 
variable 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 
Abolish RAP 289** (68) 
191** 
(67) 
169* 
(69) 
197** 
(61) 
150* 
(59) 
79 
(51)   
Abolish*NoFIT      221* (110)   
Year Abolish   -66   (65)      
Year Before 
Abolition   
-67 
(63)      
Two Years 
Before Abolition   
-133* 
(54)      
Years Abolished       37 (25) 
18 
(14) 
Years Abolished 
Squared       
-2.12  
(1.5) 
-2.6**  
(.92) 
Years Abolished 
*NoFIT        
67 
(44) 
Years Abolished 
Squared*NoFIT        
-.21  
(2.08) 
APTs  507* (221) 
515* 
(219) 
-193 
(301)  
435+ 
(234) 
534* 
(226) 
394  
(253) 
USRAP  -18 (30) 
-19 
(29) 
24 
(32) 
25 
(29) 
-4.7 
(29) 
-18 
(29) 
-12 
(30) 
NoFIT  -34 (39) 
-34 
(40) 
32 
(37) 
-48 
(37) 
-115+ 
(61) 
-7.6 
(50) 
-8.2  
(48) 
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model 
variable 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 
Income Per 
Capita  
.049**  
(.009) 
.050**  
(.009) 
.032+ 
(.018) 
.040**
(.01) 
.049**  
(.009) 
.051** 
(.008) 
.047** 
(.009) 
Test Abolish, 
APT,  
Abolish*NoFIT 
 .0001 .0001 .0015  .0065   
Test Yr, Yr2, 
*NoFIT       .33 <.0001 
Adj. R-Square .7445 .7594 .7608 .7602 .7078 .7629 .7619 .7619 
State-Specific 
Time Trends No No No Yes No No No No 
Excluding AK, 
DE, RI, MA No No No No Yes No No No 
 
N=940 for columns 1-4 and 6-8; N=874 for column 5. **sig. at <.01 level; *sig. at <.05 level; 
+sig. at <.10 level. Huber-White robust standard errors reported in parentheses. All regressions 
include state and year dummies and a constant. Data covers 1985-2003. 
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Table 4. 
reported number of state accounts (in thousands) 
model 
variable 
1 2 3 4 5 6 
Abolish RAP .47  (2.32) 
.82  
(2.48) 
1.51 
(1.51) 
-2.94+  
(1.52)   
Abolish*NoFIT    7.54
+  
(4.01)   
Years Abolished     .67 (.69) 
-.09 
(.45) 
Years Abolished 
Squared     
-.056  
(.040) 
.47  
(.33) 
Years Abolished 
*NoFIT      
2.22 
(1.28) 
Years Abolished 
Squared*NoFIT      
-.51 
(.65) 
APTs  -.068  (1.73) 
-4.21* 
(1.85) 
-2.43  
(2.63) 
-.94 
(1.81) 
-5.03  
(3.43) 
USRAP  3.34*  (1.21) 
.74       
(1.35) 
3.69*  
(1.24) 
3.49*  
(1.22) 
3.29* 
(1.22) 
NoFIT  -6.43** (2.00) 
-4.21* 
(1.84) 
-9.00** 
(2.71) 
-5.22** 
(1.88) 
-5.62** 
(2.03) 
Population 
(Millions)  
-.38 
(2.05) 
1.35 
(2.95) 
.20 
(2.00) 
-.32 
(2.05) 
-.25 
(2.0) 
       
       
       
SITKOFF & SCHANZENBACH  FINAL 11/21/2005  6:55:00 PM 
jurisdictional competition for trust funds 
429 
 
model 
variable 
1 2 3 4 5 6 
Gross State 
Income (Billions)  
-.015 
(.23) 
-.050  
(.040) 
-.086  
(.26) 
-.026 
(.23) 
-.013 
(.23) 
Test Yr, Yr2, 
*NoFIT     .0423 .0001 
Adj. R-Square .8239 .8270 .9301 .8279 .8274 .8274 
State-Specific  
Time Trends No No Yes No No No 
 
N=940. **sig. at <.01 level; *sig. at <.05 level; +sig. at <.10 level. Huber-White robust standard 
errors reported in parentheses. All regressions include state and year dummies and a constant. 
Data covers 1985-2003. 
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Table 5. 
dating of trust law changes174 
 
state rap abolished175 usrap 
self-settled asset 
protection trust 
(apt) 
fiduciary income 
tax (fit)176 
alabama — — — YES 
alaska 1997177 
1996,  
repealed 
2000 
1997 NO 
arizona 1998 1995 — YES 
arkansas — — — NO 
california — 1992 — YES 
colorado 2001 1991 —178 YES 
     
 
174.  Although the period of our study ends in 2003, for the sake of completeness this table is 
current through year-end 2004, and major 2005 perpetuities and asset protection legislation 
in Nevada and South Dakota are also noted. 
175. Except as noted otherwise, we define abolition to include any reform that would allow a 
settlor to create a perpetual trust of intangible personal property. Accordingly, our definition 
of abolition includes: (1) outright repeal of the Rule Against Perpetuities with respect to 
interests in a trust funded with intangible personal property; (2) reconfiguration of the Rule 
with respect to such trusts as a default that applies unless the settlor provides otherwise in 
the trust instrument; and (3) an exemption from the Rule for interests in a trust funded 
with intangible personal property over which the trustee has the power to sell (i.e., the trust 
does not suspend the power of alienation). See supra note 68 and accompanying text. 
176.  A YES in this column indicates that the state might levy a fiduciary income tax on the basis 
of an in-state trustee, in-state trust administration, or an in-state situs, even if the trust was 
settled by a nonresident for the benefit of nonresident beneficiaries and the trust consists 
entirely of intangible personal property. A NO indicates that state law clearly excludes such 
a trust from income taxation. We resolved ambiguity in favor of YES. See supra note 97 and 
accompanying text. 
177.  In 2000 Alaska established a 1000-year limitation on the duration of powers of 
appointment, enacted new language that more clearly abolished the Rule Against 
Perpetuities, and repealed its enactment of USRAP. 
178.  See supra note 81. 
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state rap abolished175 usrap 
self-settled asset 
protection trust 
(apt) 
fiduciary income 
tax (fit)176 
connecticut — 1989 — NO 
delaware 1995179 — 1997 NO 
florida 2001180 1988 — YES,
181  
NO beginning 2001 
georgia — 1990 — NO 
hawaii — 1992 — NO 
idaho 1957 — — YES 
illinois 1998  — NO 
indiana — 1991 — YES 
iowa — — — YES 
kansas — 1992 — YES 
kentucky — — — YES 
louisiana — — — YES 
maine 1999 — — YES 
maryland 1998 — — NO,  YES beginning 1988 
massachusetts — 1990 — YES 
michigan — 1988 — NO 
minnesota — 1991 — NO 
 
179.  Prior to 1995 it was possible to have a perpetual trust in Delaware, but this option was rarely 
invoked because of I.R.C. § 2041 (2000). See supra note 63. 
180.  In 2001 Florida amended its enactment of USRAP to provide for a 360-year perpetuities 
period for interests in trust. Because 360 years is significantly longer than is possible 
through the use of a saving clause, we count Florida as having abolished the Rule. 
181. Although Florida does not have a fiduciary income tax, it does have an intangible personal 
property tax, and before 2001 trustees of Florida situs trusts were required to pay this tax. 
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state rap abolished175 usrap 
self-settled asset 
protection trust 
(apt) 
fiduciary income 
tax (fit)176 
mississippi — — — YES 
missouri 2001 — —182 NO 
montana — 1989 — YES 
nebraska 2002 1989 — NO 
nevada 2005183 1987 1999 NO 
new hampshire 2004 — — NO 
new jersey 1999 
1991,  
repealed 
1999 
— NO 
new mexico — 1992 — YES 
new york — — — NO 
north carolina — 1995 — NO 
north dakota — 1991 — YES 
ohio 1999 — — NO, YES beginning 2003 
oklahoma — — 2004184 NO,  YES beginning 1994 
oregon — 1990 — YES 
pennsylvania — — — NO 
 
182. See supra note 81. 
183. In 2005 Nevada modified its enactment of USRAP to provide for a perpetuities period of 365 
years. Because 365 years is significantly longer than is possible through the use of a saving 
clause, we count Nevada as having abolished the Rule. 
184.  Oklahoma’s statute limits settlors to a single asset protection trust and caps the permissible 
initial funding at $1 million. We need not resolve whether to code Oklahoma differently 
from the other APT states, however, because the Oklahoma statute was enacted after the 
period of our study. 
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state rap abolished175 usrap 
self-settled asset 
protection trust 
(apt) 
fiduciary income 
tax (fit)176 
rhode island 1999 — 1999 NO 
south carolina — 1987 — YES 
south dakota 1983 — 2005 NO 
tennessee — 1994 — NO 
texas — — — NO 
utah 2004185 1998 2004 YES,  NO beginning 2004186 
vermont — — — NO 
virginia 2000 2000 — YES 
washington —187 — — NO 
west virginia — 1992 — NO 
wisconsin 1969188 — — YES,  NO after 1999 
wyoming 2003189 — — NO 
 
 
185. Utah’s statute appears to establish a 1000-year perpetuities period effective December 31, 
2003. Given the length of this period, we treat Utah as having abolished the Rule. 
186. Only trusts that “first became” Utah trusts “on or after January 1, 2004” qualify for 
exemption from the income tax. 
187. Washington extended its perpetuities period to 150 years effective January 1, 2002. Because 
150 years is not significantly longer than is possible through the use of a saving clause, we do 
not count Washington as having abolished the Rule. 
188. See supra note 117. 
189. Wyoming conditions the nonapplicability of the Rule on a provision in the trust instrument 
providing for the termination of the trust not later than 1000 years after its creation. Given 
the length of this period, we treat Wyoming as having abolished the Rule. 
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appendix a:  extended treatment of data limitations 
Exclusion of Nonreporting Trustees 
 Because our data set includes only trust assets held by federally reporting 
institutional trustees, our study does not include the entire universe of trust 
funds. Further, because inter vivos trusts are not publicly recorded, there is no 
reliable data on the proportion of trust assets held by institutional trustees as 
compared to individuals.190 There are, however, good reasons to suppose that 
our data set captures the trust funds most likely to be sensitive to the 
interaction of perpetuities and tax laws. 
First, as discussed earlier, in order to ensure the desired choice of law, out-
of-state settlors are all but required to choose a trustee located in the state 
whose law the settlor wants to govern the trust.191 Thus, unless the settlor 
knows someone who lives in the chosen state and is willing to name that 
person as trustee, the settlor has little choice but to choose a bank or other 
corporate fiduciary. Second, because a transfer-tax-exempt perpetual trust is 
designed to last in perpetuity, choosing an institutional trustee avoids the 
difficult problem of providing for trustee succession after everyone known to 
the settlor is dead. Third, anecdotal evidence suggests that the use of 
institutional trustees has become more common, particularly for larger and 
more sophisticated trusts.192 
To the extent that our data may not include some trust assets that have 
moved to take advantage of the abolition of the RAP, their omission biases our 
results down, causing us to understate the effect of abolishing the Rule. 
Inclusion of Charitable Trusts 
 Although charitable trust funds held by institutional fiduciaries are 
included in the data, we do not believe that their inclusion biases our results 
upward. 
 
190.  See Sitkoff, supra note 70, at 633 n.57. 
191.  See supra text accompanying notes 55-61. 
192.  See Gregory S. Alexander, A Cognitive Theory of Fiduciary Relationships, 85 CORNELL L. REV. 
767, 775 (2000); Langbein, supra note 25, at 638-40; see also Barbara R. Hauser, Appreciating 
Corporate Trustees, TR. & EST., Aug. 2005, at 52 (noting an increased willingness in the last 
ten years to recommend use of a corporate trustee). 
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As a theoretical matter, the distribution of charitable trust funds across 
states should not be affected by changes in state perpetuities, state tax, or 
federal tax law. Charitable trusts are privileged with an exemption from the 
RAP and from state and federal taxation. Thus neither perpetuities nor tax law 
supplies a reason to settle a charitable trust out of state. 
As an econometric matter, the differences in state trust assets caused by the 
inclusion of charitable trusts should be removed by state fixed effects, year 
dummies, and state-specific time trends. If not, the inclusion of charitable 
trusts at worst creates some noise, which would decrease our coefficient 
estimates and thus would cause us to understate the effect of abolishing the 
Rule. 
Banking Reform and Charter Jurisdiction 
In the main text we address the concern that bank mergers or 
consolidations could bias our results. A related concern is that nationally 
chartered institutions, which are regulated by the Office of the Comptroller of 
the Currency and include some rather large entities, may report all of their 
assets in only one state. To the extent that this occurs, however, the reporting 
locations tend to be in large financial centers such as New York rather than in 
the small states that were the first to abolish the RAP. Thus, if there is bias, 
once again it would tend to cut against a positive finding. Further, on an 
anecdotal level, at least several nationally chartered institutions maintain 
separately reporting offices. For example, Wells Fargo has independently 
chartered and hence separately reporting entities in Delaware, South Dakota, 
and Alaska; Citicorp has separately reporting entities in South Dakota and 
Delaware; and Bank of America has an independently chartered and separately 
reporting Delaware trust office.193 
 
193.  See FDIC, Trust Institution Search, http://www2.fdic.gov/structur/trust/search.asp (last 
visited Sept. 3, 2005) (providing a search engine to find institutions, dates of charter, 
chartering institutions, and states). Maintaining several separately chartered institutions is 
evidently a common practice. See Jonathan D. Epstein, Financial “Climate” Attracts SunTrust, 
Tiedemann Trust, NEWS J., Nov. 4, 1999, at 7B; Jonathan D. Epstein, U.S. Trust Wants To 
Set Up in Del., NEWS J., Jan. 27, 2000, at 7B. 
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appendix b:  trust assets per person 
Appendix Table 1 considers trust assets per person as the dependent 
variable. This variable is relevant for several reasons. First, by denominating 
trust assets by person, it increases the influence of large transfers to small states 
(e.g., Delaware and South Dakota), and such states may be the most 
responsive to state competition. Second, this variable divides trust assets by 
population, a factor likely to influence the amount of trust assets in a state. Our 
findings (except for the USRAP coefficient) are quite similar to those of Tables 
1, 2, and 3. 
Appendix Table 1. 
reported state trust assets per person (in thousands) 
 
model 
variable 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 
Abolish RAP 2.60** (.72) 
1.62** 
(.52) 
1.58**  
(.54) 
.68* 
(.31) 
.42 
(.33) 
-.04 
(.31)   
Abolish*NoFIT      3.28** (.74)   
Year Abolish   -.35 (.60)      
Year Before 
Abolition   
-.14   
(.92)      
Two Years 
Before Abolition   
-.16   
(1.04)      
Years Abolished       .46** (.25) 
.067 
(.078) 
Years Abolished 
Squared       
-.021* 
(.010) 
-.018** 
(.007) 
Years Abolished 
*NoFIT        
1.19** 
(.26) 
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model 
variable 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 
Years Abolished 
Squared*NoFIT        
-.023+ 
(.013) 
APTs  6.00**(2.08) 
6.10**
(2.11) 
.68 
(1.28)  
4.93* 
(2.05) 
5.91**  
(2.13) 
3.72+ 
(1.97) 
USRAP  -.67* (.29) 
-.64* 
(.29) 
.096 
(.23) 
.17 
(.22) 
-.47 
(.29) 
-.57+ 
(.30) 
-.45 
(.29) 
NoFIT  .066 (.35) 
.06 
(.35) 
-.093 
(.22) 
-.17 
(.24) 
-1.08* 
(.55) 
.093   
(.37) 
-.028 
(.36) 
Income per 
Capita/1000  
.042  
(.061) 
.048  
(.069) 
-.077 
(.084) 
-.27 
 (.51) 
.047 
(.067) 
-.058 
(.062) 
-.011 
(.061) 
Test Abolish, 
APT, 
Abolish*NoFIT 
 .0003 .0004 .1243  .0054   
Test Yr, Yr2, 
*NoFIT       .0117 >.0001 
Adj. R-Square .7713 .7894 .7906 .9204 .5725 .7953 .7988 .8051 
State-Specific 
Time Trends No No No Yes No No No No 
Excluding AK, 
DE, RI, MA No No No No Yes No No No 
 
N=940 for columns 1-4 and 6-8; N=874 for column 5. **sig. at <.01 level; *sig. at <.05 level; 
+sig. at <.10 level. Huber-White robust standard errors reported in parentheses. All regressions 
include state and year dummies and a constant. Data covers 1985-2003. 
